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Abstract
This dissertation studies three topics: sales tax avoidance, gun control, and
management practices effect on student performance.
The first chapter studies the impact of a crackdown on e-commerce avoidance
on cross-border shopping. As e-commerce has grown over the last few decades so
has states’ concern for its use for sales tax avoidance. Using a panel of Washington
State tax jurisdictions from 2005 through 2015, I estimate the effect of a sales tax
regime change on the elasticities of taxable sales. I find the regime change, targeted
at reducing sales tax avoidance through remote purchases, had a differential impact
that varied by tax jurisdiction. I find that in tax jurisdictions near the border of
lower-sales-tax states (Oregon and Idaho) consumers became more responsive to the
difference in sales tax rates across borders than their counterparts in the interior of
the state. I interpret this as a substitution by consumers along the Oregon and Idaho
border from e-commerce purchases to cross-border shopping in order to avoid sales
taxes.
The second chapter studies the effects of gun control laws on firearm deaths.
Over the past few decades, there have been large changes in many state’s gun laws.
Their effect on homicides, suicides, and overall firearm deaths is unclear. We make
use of a new database of state gun law provisions from 1991 to 2016 to test the
effectiveness of state gun control. There is a negative correlation between the number
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of gun control provisions and firearm death rates, but we find little evidence of a causal
relationship. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we test the effectiveness of 13
broad provisions on state homicides and suicide rates. We find these provisions have
little effect on reducing firearm homicides and suicides. We test two mechanisms
for the lack of effectiveness in gun control laws: gun prevalence, and gun mobility
in response to state law differences. We find some evidence that states with fewer
provisions have more firearms, initially purchased there, recovered by police in other
states.
The third chapter studies the effects of good management practices on per-
formance in the context of education. Managerial autonomy and good management
practices could be either technical substitutes or complements in the production of
organizational performance. We provide empirical evidence on the direction of this
relationship by studying management practices and their effects on student perfor-
mance in a large set of public and private schools in Indiana. We gather data on
management practices from structured interviews with principals of 76 schools in
Indiana and match those interviewees to their students’ performance on the state
standardized test. We find that a one standard deviation (s.d.) increase in a school’s
management score is associated with a 0.024 s.d. increase in those students’ average
math score and a 0.025 s.d. increase in students’ average English/Language Arts
(ELA) test score. The relationship between a school’s management practices and its
students’ academic performance appears to differ by school type. This is suggestive
that managerial autonomy and management practices are complements. However,
differences in student characteristics explain much of the difference in student perfor-
mance.
iii
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Chapter 1
Tax Avoidance through
E-commerce and Cross-Border
Shopping
1.1 Introduction
The growth of e-commerce over the last few decades has placed increased
pressure on states’ ability to raise revenue through sales taxes. The United States
Government Accountability Office (GAO) estimates the lost revenue for state and
local governments from avoidance on e-commerce purchases to be between $8 and
$13 billion for 2017 (GAO 2017). Consumers were able to avoid sales taxes on many
e-commerce purchases because out-of-state sellers with no physical presence in a state
were not required by law to collect sales taxes.1 The Supreme Court of the United
States overturned the physical presence requirement in a June 2018 ruling.2 To under-
1This was the key ruling in National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.
S. 753 (1967) and Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U. S. 298 (1992).
2The requirement was overturned in South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 585 U.S. (2018).
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stand how the Supreme Court’s ruling will affect sales tax avoidance, I look at a July
2008 Washington State tax regime change (hereafter known as the regime change) as
a prototype. While both the regime change and the Supreme Court’s ruling reduce
sales tax avoidance on e-commerce purchases, cross-border shopping remains as an
avenue to avoid sales taxes.
The effectiveness of ending sales tax avoidance on e-commerce purchases will
depend on consumers’ substitution to cross-border shopping. This paper studies the
degree to which consumers substitute between the two forms of avoidance using the
Washington State regime change. The incentive to cross-border shop varies across
each of Washington State’s borders because of variation in its neighbor’s rates. I look
at how consumers respond to changes in the rate differentials before and after the
regime change. In order to identify the effect, I use a difference-in-difference approach
using the interior counties as the control and a separate group for each border. I find
that following the regime change, tax jurisdictions near lower-tax state borders saw
the largest increase in responsiveness. Consumers in tax jurisdictions near the Oregon
border, where the rate differential is the largest, are the most responsive to a change
in the rate differential following the regime change. I find that following the regime
change, a one percentage point increase in the sales tax rate differential leads to
approximately a 29 percent decrease in taxable retail sales per capita, on average, in
tax jurisdictions near Oregon. I also find that following the regime change consumers
in the interior of the state became less responsive to changes in the tax differential.
E-commerce purchases provide a means of sales tax avoidance for all consumers
while cross-border shopping tends to be limited to consumers near lower-tax borders.
A policy that reduces sales tax avoidance on e-commerce purchases would have a
differential effect depending on consumers’ outside option of avoidance. Washington
State provides an excellent case study because its three neighbors (Oregon, Idaho,
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and British Columbia) each have substantially different sales tax rates. Oregon has
no sales tax and provides the largest incentive to cross-border shop. Idaho imposes
a six percent sales tax rate and provides less of an incentive to cross-border shop.3
British Columbia is unique because it provides no incentive to cross-border shop as
it levies a five percent federal VAT in addition to its seven percent sales tax.4 While
Washington State has a uniform sales-tax rate of 6.5 percent, the rates consumers
face vary across tax jurisdictions because of local-option sales taxes.5 The average
combined sales-tax rate for tax jurisdiction in the sample is 8.2 percent.
The tax regime change consisted of two components. First, Washington State
changed its sourcing rules from an origin principle to a destination principle. Under a
destination principle, goods are taxed based on where they are received instead of be-
ing taxed based on their shipping origin.6 Thus, consumers can no longer have goods
shipped to them from lower-tax jurisdictions to avoid sales taxes. Second, Washing-
ton State became a full member of the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement
(SSUTA) which improved the collection of sales taxes on e-commerce purchases.7 It
did so by increasing the number of out-of-state businesses collecting sales taxes for
Washington State. While I cannot separate the effects, both effects should work in
the same direction.
Finally, I estimate the effect of the regime change on the taxable sales per
3Idaho decreased its sales tax rate to five percent for the period of July 1, 2005, to September
30, 2006.
4It could also be the case that Canadians shop in Washington State to avoid British Columbia
sales tax. Canada’s VAT was seven percent until June 30, 2006, when it dropped to six percent from
July 1, 2006, to December 31, 2007. On January 1, 2008, it decreased to five percent.
5In my analysis tax jurisdictions are defined as either cities or the unincorporated parts of coun-
ties. Both cities and counties have local option sales taxes, but state law places constraints on the
local option rates.
6This change in sourcing rules only applies to within state sales. Washington State sales taxes
cannot be collected on goods sold to consumers out of state.
7SSUTA is a multi-state sales tax agreement with the goal of improving sales tax collection by
out-of-state businesses. The agreement works to reduce the compliance cost for businesses collecting
and remitting sales tax to multiple state and local tax jurisdictions.
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capita for the different border groups while holding each border group’s tax differential
constant at is sample average. As expected, the regime change increases the reported
taxable retail sales per capita for the tax jurisdictions in counties that border either
Idaho or Canada. Consumers in these jurisdiction either face higher cost of travel
to a lower-tax state or the tax differentials are much smaller. I find that the regime
change increases the reported taxable retail sales per capita by almost 20 percent,
on average, for tax jurisdictions that border Canada. For the tax jurisdictions that
border Idaho, I find that the regime change increases the reported taxable retail sales
per capita by 18.5 percent. I find no effect of the regime change on the reported
taxable retail sales for the tax jurisdictions that border Oregon. This is expected if
consumers substitute to cross-border shopping.
1.2 Literature Review
1.2.1 Sales Tax Avoidance
Tax avoidance through cross-border shopping has been studied for a variety of
goods including retail trade, groceries, alcohol, cigarettes, gasoline, and lottery tickets.
Leal et al. (2010) provide a survey of the literature. The literature consistently finds
evidence that differences in sales tax rates between tax jurisdictions induce cross-
border shopping, although the estimated elasticities vary across the good covered
in the studies. I build upon this literature by following the standard approach of
comparing tax jurisdictions on the border of the state to those in its interior.8
As the internet grew and online shopping became more prevalent, remote
sellers who did not collect sales taxes became a more feasible option for consumers
8In the literature a tax jurisdiction tends to be a county.
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to avoid sales tax. The earliest studies of the impact of e-commerce on sales tax
avoidance are Goolsbee (2000), Alm and Melnik (2005), and Ballard and Lee (2007).
All three use survey data on consumers’ use of the internet for shopping and find
that consumers in higher sales tax areas were more likely to use the internet for
shopping. The broadest of these studies, Ballard and Lee (2007), uses data from
the 1997 and 2001 Current Population Surveys. They find that consumers in higher
sales tax counties are more likely to shop on the internet, but to a lesser degree in a
county bordering a county with a lower sales tax rate. They interpret these results
as evidence of cross-border shopping.
The findings of Ballard and Lee (2007) suggest that consumers in higher tax
rate jurisdictions of Washington State are more likely to use the internet to avoid sales
tax. Because the higher tax jurisdictions are located in the interior of Washington
State, a policy that decreases sales tax avoidance through e-commerce purchases will
have a differential effect that varies with distance from the state border. Since e-
commerce in the United States has grown, from $27.6 billion in 2000 to over $449
billion in 2017, it is worth reconsidering if the greater number of e-commerce options
available to consumers have changed these results.9
More-recent studies of sales tax avoidance through e-commerce purchases focus
on consumers’ use of specific companies to avoid sales tax. Einav et al. (2014) analyze
detailed browsing data from eBay from 2008 to 2010 and estimate that purchases by
interested buyers fall by about two percent for every one percentage point increase in
the sales tax rate charged by the seller. They also find that a one percentage point
increase in a state’s sales tax rate leads to about a two percent increase in online
purchases from other states and a three to four percent decrease in online purchases
9Author’s calculation using data from U.S. quarterly e-commerce reports. The data used can
be found at https://www.census.gov/retail/index.html. As a percentage of retail trade sales
e-commerce was 0.93% of retail sales in 2000 and 8.87% of retail sales in 2017.
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from home sellers.
Baugh et al. (2014) evaluate the impact of 19 states implementing so-called
“Amazon Laws” on household purchases from Amazon.com, Inc. using daily financial
transaction data for 460,000 households from January 2011 to May 2015.10 They find
that households reduced the dollar amount of their purchases from Amazon by 9.1
percent after Amazon laws are enacted. For large purchases (at least $250) they find
an even stronger effect, with households reducing the dollar amount of their Amazon
purchases by 29.1 percent.
The Baugh et al. (2014) study is of particular relevance to this paper because
Amazon’s headquarters are in Washington State. Therefore, Amazaon has always
been required to collect sales taxes on its in-state sales.11 So while the change in
sourcing rules would change the sales tax rate charged to many consumers on their
purchases from Amazon, any substitution to Amazon’s competitors (that do not
collect sales tax) should have occurred before the law change. For other states,
this could be a concern because when Baugh et al. (2014) limit their analysis to
transactions involving only electronics item, they find some evidence of households
substituting from Amazon to a competing online electronics retailer. Because Amazon
is the largest online retailer, the impact of increased sales tax collection on e-commerce
purchases could have a larger impact on cross-border shopping in other states if
Amazon were one of the companies to start collecting sales taxes.
While both the Einav et al. (2014) and Baugh et al. (2014) studies highlight
the use of e-commerce for sales tax avoidance they do not address its impact on
cross-border shopping. The findings of both studies suggest that consumers substi-
10Amazon Laws are laws with the goal of requiring Amazon.com, Inc. to collect sales tax from
consumers at checkout. The main approach is to establish a click-through-nexus. A click-through-
nexus objective is to get around the physical presence requirement and establish a nexus for Amazon.
11There are sellers who use Amazon’s marketplace that may not have been collecting sales taxes.
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tute to other e-commerce options to avoid sales taxes. The regime change I study does
not eliminate avoidance through e-commerce purchases; it only reduces its feasibil-
ity. Therefore, depending on how successful other policies are at reducing avoidance
through e-commerce purchases, the effects could be larger. To the best of my knowl-
edge, this is the first paper that provides evidence on the degree to which consumers
substitute between the two methods of avoidance.
1.2.2 Cross-Border Shopping in Washington
Previous research has established that sales tax avoidance through cross-border
shopping occurs in Washington State (McAllister 1961; Beck 1992; Wooster and
Lehner 2010). The most recent work, Wooster and Lehner (2010), uses annual re-
ported taxable sales data aggregated to the county level from 1992 to 2006. It esti-
mates the difference between interior and border counties in their elasticities of sales
with respect to the tax differences to be -3.11 over this time period. I build on their
results in several ways. First, I use quarterly jurisdiction-level data. Second, I use a
different classification of the border and interior.12 Third, my study includes observa-
tions made both before and after the regime change. This allows me to estimate the
effect of joining the SSUTA and switching from an origin principle to a destination
principle.
12In their classification of the border and interior, they treat all counties along the Canadian
border as part of the interior of the state, while grouping counties that border Oregon or Idaho
as the border counties. I deviate by allowing for a different effect along all three borders. I do so
because the sales tax rate differential varies across all three borders.
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1.3 Background and the Regime Change
State officials are concerned with sales tax collection by businesses because if
sales taxes are not collected and remitted by businesses, it falls on the consumer to pay
use tax.13 Compliance with use tax by consumers is known to be low, leading to large
revenue losses for states and local governments. The rise of e-commerce increased
the feasibility of sales tax avoidance increasing revenue losses. The Washington State
regime change was trying to reduce this revenue loss from e-commerce.
Sales tax avoidance through e-commerce and mail-order purchases is a newer
means of avoidance. It arose from the Supreme Court’s ruling in National Bellas
Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Ill.14 The Bellas Hess ruling was upheld
25 years later in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota.15 Both rulings held that a state
cannot compel businesses without a physical presence in that state to collect and
remit sales tax.16 However, “physical presence” was not well defined in these rulings
and many states expanded the definition of physical presence to establish a nexus
for out-of-state sellers (Agrawal and Fox 2017).17 The option for consumers to avoid
sales tax through e-commerce purchases has likely ended with the United States
Supreme Court overturning Quill Corp. v. North Dakota and the physical presence
requirement in the June 21, 2018 ruling in South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.18 Therefore,
many states could see an increase in cross-border shopping as consumers substitute
to this longstanding method of sales-tax avoidance.
13Use tax is a sales tax equivalent rate that is owed on all purchases for which sales tax is owed
but has not been collected. When use tax is not paid it is tax evasion.
14National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Ill., 386 U. S. 753 (1967)
15Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U. S. 298 (1992)
16The justification in Quill was the high compliance cost for businesses to file sales tax returns in
multiple states and local tax jurisdictions.
17Nexus refers to the legal requirement to collect and remit sales tax. A business that has a
physical presence in a state is said to have established a nexus in a state.
18South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 585 U.S. (2018).
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On July 1, 2008, Substitute Senate Bill 5089 (SSB 5089) went into effect.
This changed Washington State’s sales tax sourcing rules from an origin principle to
a destination principle. Simultaneously they became full members of the SSUTA. I
study the full effect of the tax regime change because I am unable to separate the two
effects. However, both components should work in the same direction, increasing the
difficulty of avoiding sales taxes through e-commerce purchases. I expect a differential
effect within Washington State as many consumers still have the option to cross-
border shop to avoid sales taxes.
A shift from an origin to a destination basis for sales taxation only matters
for goods that are shipped between tax jurisdictions. Goods taken possession of in a
store, or delivered within the same tax jurisdiction are charged the same sales tax rate
under either sourcing principle. Because the tax regime shift should primarily affect
goods that can easily be shipped, it should have a differential impact on different
types of good. To test this, I analyze the reported taxable dollar amount of sales
per capita for four classifications of business separately; all businesses selling taxed
goods, non-retail trade businesses, retail trade businesses, and e-commerce or mail-
order businesses. I expect retail goods and e-commerce goods to be more conducive
to tax avoidance, and therefore the expected effect of the regime shift to be larger for
those categories.
While the change to a destination principle was about reducing avoidance on
consumer purchases from out-of-state businesses, the change in sourcing principle
removed the possibility for consumers to use remote purchases within the state to
pay a lower sales tax rate. Because Washington State has a uniform state sales
tax rate, under either set of sourcing rules the state does not lose tax revenue from
within-state avoidance of local sales tax. Following the change in sourcing rules, some
local governments were expected to lose sales tax revenue because it changed which
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tax jurisdiction receives the revenue for sales which are delivered across jurisdictions.
Because of variation in local option sales tax rates, the change in which jurisdiction
receives revenue from a sale also changed the sales tax rate applied on these within
state purchases.19
The second part of the regime change, the joining of the SSUTA, improved sales
tax collection at both the state and local level by increasing voluntary collection by
out-of-state sellers.20 When Washington State became a full member of the SSUTA
all businesses that were registered as sellers with SSUTA and were not previously
collecting sales tax for sales in Washington State were required to do so. While I
cannot observe how many sellers started collecting following the regime change, the
upper bound would be the 1200 sellers registered with the SSUTA at the time of the
regime change.21
While the SSUTA cannot compel businesses to register with it, there are some
incentives for companies to join.22 All SSUTA member states adopt common language
and definitions in their tax codes to reduce the compliance costs of businesses collect-
ing and remitting sales taxes. Each member state also uses a central state agency for
the collection of state and local tax revenue, which ensures that businesses only have
to file with each state and not with individual local tax jurisdictions within states.
All member states also publish resources to help companies calculate the appropriate
sales tax to collect on each transaction.23
19The change in sourcing rules also established clear rules for out-of-state sellers regarding the
sales tax rate they should apply. This should have improved collection, by clarifying compliance
requirements for out-of-state sellers.
20Voluntary compliance is necessary because states could not compel many businesses to collect
sales tax. So they worked together to get businesses to register with SSUTA.
21As of July 31, 2018, there were 3969 sellers registered with the SSUTA.
22Its member states are: Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Min-
nesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming. Tennessee
is an associate member.
23One such resource is a GIS database of sales tax rates that can be used to find the appropriate
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The SSUTA also provides several additional incentives to register. When a
business registers with the SSUTA, it is automatically registered with all member
states and is assigned a unique tax identification number to simplify filing in member
states. In addition, registered sellers are allowed the use state-certified automated
software for all tax calculations and receive liability relief for incorrect tax calculations
by the software. For sellers who are voluntarily collecting taxes, member states absorb
a fraction of the cost of the software.
Businesses uncertain of their legal obligation to collect sales taxes may also
voluntarily register to avoid any penalties and fines.24 Many states changed their
laws to expand the definition of physical presence and businesses would have to be
constantly watching for changes in their legal obligation to collect sales taxes. If
the cost of ensuring compliance with all states was high, businesses could choose to
voluntarily collect sales taxes. In this paper I do not study why businesses choose
to collect sales taxes voluntarily, I only observe that they do. So while increased
collection by businesses is observed I do not distinguish why it is occurring.
A 2011 study by the Washington State Joint Legislative Audit & Review Com-
mittee (JLARC) found that while new revenue was received from voluntary compli-
ance following SSB 5089, it was less than expected. For the 2009 fiscal year, the
expected tax revenue from voluntary compliance was $49.1 million, but the actual
revenue received was $5.6 million. For 2010, sales tax revenue from voluntary com-
pliance was expected to be $59 million but the actual tax revenue collected was $7.1
million. These results are not unique as several other states that joined SSUTA had
lower than expected collection from voluntary compliance (Joint Legislative Audit &
sales tax rate.
24Some states have offered amnesty for tax penalties in exchange for businesses registering with
the SSUTA. Sellers must remain registered and continue to collect and remit the applicable sales
taxes for at least 36 months. Currently, Tennessee is the only state offering amnesty.
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Review Committee 2011). To some extent, Washington State may have been overly
optimistic in its projections, but an unanticipated substitution to other means of
avoidance would contribute to the lower sales tax revenue as well. This paper pro-
vides evidence that substitution occurred.
1.4 Empirical Framework
The sourcing principle alters both the tax base and taxpayers’ response to a
change in the sales tax rate differential between neighboring jurisdictions. In addition,
a change in the sourcing principle can improve enforcement on remote purchases.
1.4.1 Reported Taxable Sales under an Origin Principle
The total expenditure by a tax jurisdiction’s residents under an origin principle
can be expressed as
Eo = P (q
o
s + q
o
r + q
o
b ), (1.1)
where qos is the quantity of goods purchased under an origin principle within the
jurisdictions, qor is the quantity of goods purchased remotely, and q
o
b is the quantity
of goods purchased across a border. The reported taxable sales for a tax jurisdiction
under an origin principle can be expressed as
So = P (q
o
s + q
o
n + q
o
r,n + θ
o
rq
o
r + θ
o
bq
o
b ). (1.2)
The variable qon is the quantity of goods purchased in tax jurisdictions by non-residents
shopping in the jurisdiction. The term qor,n is the remote purchases by consumers
from other tax jurisdictions in Washington State. This can be thought of as tax
jurisdictions exporting goods and receiving sales tax revenue from these sales. The
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term θor is the fraction of remote purchases on which use tax is paid and the term θ
o
b
is the fraction of purchases across borders on which use tax is paid.
A consumer in a tax jurisdiction can make online or mail-order purchases from
businesses within the state or out-of-the state. I assume that all remote purchases
by consumers from out-of-state businesses are untaxed under the origin principle and
that no use tax is paid on these purchases. Consumers who remotely purchase goods
from a business within their state are charged the sales tax rate of the tax jurisdiction
where the business is located. The tax jurisdiction where the business is located
receives the revenue for the sale. This means on remote purchases a consumer’s home
jurisdiction receives no sales tax revenue. Under these assumptions then θor = 0. I
also assume that no use tax is paid on cross-border purchases and therefore θob = 0
as well. This allows me to rewrite Equation (1.2) as
So = P (q
o
s + q
o
n + q
o
r,n). (1.3)
Then the change in the reported total taxable sales with respect to a change
in a tax jurisdiction’s sales tax rate is
dSo
dts
= P (
dqos
dts
+
dqon
dts
+
dqor,n
dts
). (1.4)
This tells us that a tax jurisdiction’s reported taxable sales depend on consumers
decisions to buy within jurisdiction as well as the decision of non-jurisdiction residents
to purchase goods for a jurisdiction.
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1.4.2 Reported Taxable Sales under a Destination Principle
Total expenditure by a tax jurisdiction’s residents under a destination principle
can be expressed as
Ed = P (q
d
s + q
d
r + q
d
b ). (1.5)
The variable qds is the quantity of goods purchased within jurisdiction, q
d
r is the
quantity of goods purchased remotely, and qdb is the quantity of goods purchased
across borders. Now under a destination principle the reported taxable sales for a
tax jurisdiction can be expressed as
Sd = P (q
d
s + q
d
n + θ
d
rq
d
r + θ
d
b q
d
b ) (1.6)
where qdn is the quantity of goods purchased in the tax jurisdiction by non-jurisdiction
residents shopping there. The term θdr is the fraction of remote purchases on which
either sales or use tax is paid and the term θdb is the fraction of purchases made
across borders on which use tax is paid. I again assume no use tax is paid on cross-
border purchases and so θdb = 0. Because remote purchases are now credited to the
jurisdiction receiving them, θdr > 0 if any remote purchases are made by consumers
from businesses in the state. If there are still out-of-state sellers not collecting sales
tax on remote purchases and consumers do no pay use tax on these remote purchases
then θdr < 1. For simplicity, I assume that after a state joins the SSUTA no sales tax
avoidance through remote purchases remains so that θdr = 1. Equation (1.6) can then
be written as
Sd = P (q
d
s + q
d
n + q
d
r ). (1.7)
The change in the reported total taxable sales with respect to a change in a
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tax jurisdiction’s sales tax rate is
dSd
dts
= P (
dqds
dts
+
dqdn
dts
+
dqdr
dts
) (1.8)
where qdr ≈ qor+ ∂qr∂tr (ts−tu). Where tr is the tax rate actually paid on remote purchases,
ts is the sales tax rate of the jurisdiction, and tu is the use tax rate actually paid on
remote purchases prior to the regime change. So tr primarily captures the response
of consumers to remote purchases going from untaxed to taxed.
1.4.3 Change in a Jurisdiction’s Tax Base
For a given sales-tax rate the change in reported taxable sales for a tax juris-
diction because of the regime change is
∆S = Sd − So = P (qds + qdn + qdr )− P (qos + qon + qor,n). (1.9)
I now make several simplifying assumptions. First, qds = q
o
s when there is no change
in the sales tax rate. Second, I assume that qdn = q
o
n when there is no change in the
sales tax rates. Therefore,
∆S = Sd − So = P (qdr − qor,n). (1.10)
For the first-order approximation that qdr ≈ qor + ∂qr∂tr (ts − tu),
∆S = P (qor +
∂qr
∂tr
(ts − tu)− qor,n). (1.11)
Equation (1.11) states that the change in the reported taxable sales in a tax jurisdic-
tion increases by the remote purchases made in a jurisdiction less any substitution by
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consumers away from remote purchases. Consumers substitute away because these
purchases are now subject to sales taxes. A jurisdiction also loses revenue from any
remote purchases made to businesses in the jurisdiction by consumers in other tax
jurisdictions. The percentage change in reported total taxable sales because of the
change in sourcing rules and the improved enforcement on remote purchases is there-
fore
∆S
So
=
qor +
∂qr
∂tr
(ts − tu)− qor,n
P (qos + q
o
n + q
o
r,n)
. (1.12)
In terms of the elasticity of remote purchases with respect to the tax rate
collected on remote purchases,
∂qr
∂tr
(ts − tu) = ηr,tqor
(ts − tu)
tr
. (1.13)
If no use tax is paid on remote purchases, tu = 0 and
(ts−tu)
tr
= 1, so
∆S
So
=
qor + ηr,tq
o
r − qor,n
P (qos + q
o
n + q
o
r,n)
. (1.14)
The value of ηr,t depends in part on the ease of cross-border shopping for consumers.
In tax jurisdictions close to the Oregon border, where the cost of travel to cross-
border shop is lower and consumers can fully avoid sales tax, consumers will be more
responsive to remote purchases being taxed than will consumers elsewhere in the
state.
1.4.4 Changes in the Elasticities
Because a change in sourcing rules changes the tax base for a jurisdiction,
taxable-sales elasticities will differ by tax regime. Any change in the observed elas-
ticities also includes the differential enforcement of sales tax collection on remote
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purchases under the two regimes.
1.4.4.1 Under the Origin Principle
Under the origin principle the elasticity of reported taxable sales with respect
to a change in the sales tax rate is
∂So
∂ts
= P (
∂qos
∂ts
+
∂qon
∂ts
+
∂qor,n
∂ts
). (1.15)
In response to an increase in the sales tax rate differential, consumers in a tax ju-
risdiction can substitute to remote purchases or cross-border shopping. This should
make the elasticities more similar across jurisdictions under the origin principle as
consumers have a fairly equal way to avoid sales tax. If it is difficult for consumers
to avoid their local sales tax, either because the good is difficult to obtain through
remote purchase or because the cost of travel to cross-border shop is high, then the
tax elasticities will be smaller than those for areas where it is easier to avoid.
1.4.4.2 Under the Destination Principle
If the destination principle makes sales-tax avoidance on remote purchases
prohibitively difficult, then the elasticity of taxable sales with respect to the tax
differential is
∂Sd
∂ts
= P (
∂qds
∂ts
+
∂qdn
∂ts
+
∂qdr
∂ts
). (1.16)
Each tax jurisdiction’s base has now changed; as only purchases within a jurisdiction
are subject to its sales tax. Under my assumptions, consumers in all tax jurisdictions
are now limited to cross-border shopping as a way to avoid sales taxes. This should
increase the difference in the elasticities between the tax jurisdictions on the borders
of the state and those in the interior of the state.
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1.4.4.3 Effect of the change in Policy
The change in elasticities due to a change in tax basis is
∂Sd
∂ts
− ∂So
∂ts
= P (
∂qds
∂ts
+
∂qdn
∂ts
+
∂qdr
∂ts
− ∂q
o
s
∂ts
− ∂q
o
n
∂ts
− ∂q
o
r,n
∂ts
). (1.17)
Assuming that under both principles that consumers respond the same to the change
in the sales tax rate on purchases already subject to tax, that is ∂q
d
s
∂ts
= ∂q
o
s
∂ts
and
∂qdn
∂ts
= ∂q
o
n
∂ts
, then the change in the elasticities because of the change in policy is
∂Sd
∂ts
− ∂So
∂ts
= P (
∂qdr
∂ts
− ∂q
o
r,n
∂ts
). (1.18)
The difference in the change in the elasticities across tax jurisdictions will capture
both the differences in the ability of consumers to substitute away from taxable remote
purchases to cross-border shopping and the loss of remote purchases by consumers
not in the tax jurisdiction.
1.5 Data
To estimate the effect of the regime change on the change in the elasticities
with respect to the sales tax rate differential, I use the quarterly reported taxed dollar
amount of sales in a tax jurisdiction from 2005 to 2015. These data are available
at the Washington State (DOR) website. The DOR publishes the dollar amount
of taxed sales based on the broad business classification of the seller. The DOR
classifies sellers by their primary taxable activity using the North America Industry
Classification System (NAICS). In my analysis, I use four levels of classifications to
measure the impact on the reported dollar amount of taxed sales: all sellers, non-
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retail trade sellers, retail trade sellers, and e-commerce and mail-order sellers. Retail
trade sellers are identified by the NAICS two-digit codes 44 and 45, while e-commerce
and mail-order sellers are identified by the four-digit NAICS code 4541.25 I expect
the regime change to have the largest impact on taxable retail trade and e-commerce
sales because these are the goods for which consumers can feasibly avoid sales taxes
by either means.
The DOR compiles data on the dollar amount of taxed sales at the tax juris-
diction level from tax returns filed by businesses with the DOR.26 They also publish
the number of businesses reporting taxable sales in a jurisdiction.27
Sales tax rates are set and published quarterly for all tax jurisdictions. A
jurisdiction’s sales tax rate consists of the state rate (6.5 percent throughout the
sample), its local option city and county rates, and any additional rates applied by
special districts.28 The data on the combined sales tax rates were collected from sales
tax rate flyers published by the DOR. There are 324 tax jurisdictions in the panel.
By using quarterly data, I can accurately account for the start of the regime change,
which went into effect at the start of the third quarter of 2008.
Because the number of residents in a tax jurisdiction varies substantially, I
convert all the reported dollar amount of taxed sales to per capita values. As a
measure of the population in a tax jurisdiction, I use annual population estimates for
cities and the unincorporated parts of counties published by the Washington State
25E-commerce and mail order sellers are a subcategory of retail trade sellers. A list of what is clas-
sified as retail trade can be found at https://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch?
chart=2012. Some of the stores included are those that sell furniture, electronics, appliances, and
clothing.
26Businesses either report monthly, quarterly, or annually depending on their estimated annual
tax liability. A monthly filling is required for an estimated annual tax liability over $4,800, annually
filling for a liability less than $1,050 and quarterly for any tax liability in between.
27A tax jurisdiction either corresponds to a city or the unincorporated parts of a county.
28Special districts are primarily public transportation benefit areas whose rate often apply to
several tax jurisdictions.
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Office of Financial Management (OFM). I match the population estimates to their
corresponding tax jurisdictions to obtain the per capita dollar amount of taxed sales.
To control for income differences across tax jurisdictions that could affect per
capita sale, I use IRS tax return data at the five-digit postal zip code level. I match
these data on the adjusted gross income and number of returns to their corresponding
tax jurisdictions using zip codes obtained from the DOR. I then calculate an aver-
age adjusted gross income per return as a proxy for a tax jurisdiction’s per capita
income.29 I include OFM data on population demographics at the county level as
additional controls. These include the fraction of the population younger than 19
and the fraction of the population older than 64. Both demographic controls are
observed annually. Because Washington State does not tax food, food ingredients, or
prescription drugs, areas with a larger number of elderly people are expected to have
a lower taxable retail sales because they spend less income on taxable goods (Wooster
and Lehner 2010).30 I also expect that e-commerce is used less in areas with older
populations.
Because a higher cost of travel should decrease cross-border shopping, I include
a proxy for the cost of travel that uses the road distance (in miles) to a lower-tax
neighbor and fuel cost. To obtain a measure of road distance to a lower-tax neighbor,
I use GIS data published by the DOR to calculate the centers of the tax jurisdictions.
Using the center point, I calculate road distance to a lower-tax neighbor using the
Stata command georoute created by Weber and Pe´clat (2017). In defining a lower-
tax neighbor, I choose the closest out-of-state major city in a lower-tax state that
provides a significant retail opportunity.31 For most of the sample this is measured
29It should be noted that Washington State has no income tax.
30For a full list of goods that are exempt from Washington State sales tax seehttps://dor.wa.
gov/find-taxes-rates/retail-sales-tax/retail-sales-and-use-tax-exemptions.
31In defining a major city I follow Wooster and Lehner (2010). The jurisdictions in Benton County
are measured to Hermiston, OR. The jurisdictions in Walla Walla County are measured to Milton-
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to either Portland, Oregon or Coeur D’Alene, Idaho.
In calculating the cost of travel, I deviate from previous work on cross-border
shopping in Washington State in two ways. First, I use road distance instead of
linear distance. Second, I measure distance from a tax jurisdiction rather than from
a county seat to its lower-tax neighbor. The use of road distance should produce a
better proxy for travel cost because road routes are not direct. For example, in many
places in Washington State crossings to the neighboring states are limited to bridges
over rivers.
To construct my measure of travel cost, I multiply the road distance to a lower
tax neighbor by the quarterly average real price of regular gasoline in Washington
State. The weekly price of gasoline was obtained from the United States Energy
Information Administration and used to create a quarterly average. By measuring
distance from the tax jurisdiction instead of the county seat and using road distance
instead of linear distance, I more accurately measure the cost of travel consumers
face.
To control for business activity in a tax jurisdiction, I include a proxy for the
number of firms in a jurisdiction using the number of firms covered by unemployment
insurance in the county. This is reported quarterly by the Employment Security
Department of Washington State (ESD). Because some purchases by businesses are
also subject to sales taxes, including the number of businesses will improve my esti-
mates. A 2016 study by the Washington State DOR estimates that for 2011 use-tax
non-compliance by businesses accounted for $86.3 million in unreported taxes (Wash-
ington State Department of Revenue 2016). This suggests that sales-tax avoidance
by businesses could be significant because use-tax evasion is only possible when sales
Freewater, OR. The jurisdictions in Whitman County are measured to Moscow, ID. The jurisdictions
in Pend Oreille County are measured to Oldtown, ID. The jurisdictions in Asotin, Columbia, and
Garfield County are measured to Lewiston, Idaho
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taxes have not been collected.
I also include a proxy for the number of retail firms in a tax jurisdiction to
control for the retail shopping available to consumers. These data are also obtained
from the ESD.32 Tax jurisdictions with fewer retail shopping options are likely to have
lower reported dollar amounts of taxable retail sales if consumers shop elsewhere.
Consumers may also purchase more goods through e-commerce when they have fewer
physical stores to shop at.
Since economic conditions will affect the dollar amount of taxed sales in a
jurisdiction, I also include the quarterly average unemployment rate for the counties.
Data on the unemployment rate are obtained from the local area unemployment
statistics published by the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics. I also include
quarter-year fixed effects to account for economic trends.
Table 1.1 presents the summary statistics for the tax jurisdictions in the panel
split by border group.33 Figure 1.1 illustrates the border groups. The border groups
are all tax jurisdictions that are located in counties that border Oregon, all tax
jurisdictions in counties that border Idaho, all tax jurisdictions that border British
Columbia, and the remaining tax jurisdictions make up the interior.34 As is expected,
the tax jurisdictions in the interior of Washington State and those that border Canada
have the highest reported taxable retail sales per capita. For the tax jurisdictions near
a lower-sales-tax-rate border, I observe lower reported taxable sales per capita. These
observations are consistent with the story that greater sales tax avoidance is occurring
in jurisdictions near the border.
32These are identified by the NAICS two-digit codes 44 and 45.
33For some small tax jurisdictions, no Zip Code level IRS tax return data is published. This leads
to 324 observations being dropped during estimation.
34Three counties that sit on the Oregon border, Asotin, Columbia, and Garfield, are included in
the Idaho border group. This is because they have no direct crossing to Oregon and their nearest
neighbor is Lewiston, Idaho.
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Because the focus of this paper is on the differential impact of the regime
change, Table 1.2 presents the averages broken down by border group before and
after the regime change. Comparing the pre and post columns in Table 1.2 it appears
that all border groups experience an increase in e-commerce sales per capita, with
the largest increase occurring in those tax jurisdictions that border Canada. This is
expected because British Columbia has a higher sales tax rate and does not provide
a feasible option to cross-border shop. The effect of the regime change on reported
taxable retail sales also appears to differ across groups. Because it appears that the
average response varies across border groups, I allow for each border group to have a
different response to the regime change in my analysis.
Figure 1.2 presents a heat map of sales-tax rates by jurisdiction. The map
shows that the jurisdictions with the highest tax rate tend to be cities far from the
borders. This is expected because these are the jurisdictions where the cost of travel
to cross-border shop is the highest. Cities also tend to have higher tax rates than
the unincorporated parts of the counties in which they are located. This is because
county sales tax rates also apply to cities, increasing their combined sales tax rate.
Following the change in sourcing rules, businesses collecting sales tax in Wash-
ington State must collect sales tax for each Washington State tax jurisdiction to which
they deliver goods. If a large number of businesses deliver goods to multiple juris-
dictions, then the regime change would increase the number of reported sellers in all
jurisdictions. It is important to note that I cannot distinguish between the number
of new sellers collecting in the state following the regime change and a change in how
businesses report their sales. Figures 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5 show that the average number
of sellers reporting in tax jurisdictions did increase across all border groups and for
all business classifications.35 The increase is expected given the change in reporting,
35These figures were created using a binscatter while allowing for a discontinuity at the regime
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and the increase is the number of out-of-state sellers voluntarily collecting sales taxes
for Washington State.
Figure 1.3 shows that, while the average number of businesses classified as
e-commerce is increasing over time for all groups, it appears to be increasing faster in
interior tax jurisdictions than in border counties tax jurisdictions following the regime
change. This would indicate that consumers in border counties purchase fewer goods
from e-commerce companies. Because retail trade businesses that have brick-and-
mortar stores can also maintain an online presence their online sales would also be
affected by the regime change.36 This means that retail stores are also counted for
each tax jurisdiction they shipped goods to. Looking at Figure 1.4 it appears that on
average the number of retailers sellers in tax jurisdictions is increasing but not at the
same rate as e-commerce and mail order sellers. The pattern of a greater increase in
the number of e-commerce and mail orders sellers in the interior counties is expected
as consumers in tax jurisdictions near the state borders should be more likely to
cross-border shop and less likely to buy from local sellers or e-commerce companies
that collect sales taxes.
1.6 Empirical Strategy
Because Washington State’s neighbors have different sales-tax rates, I expect
the response to the regime change and changes in tax elasticities to vary location.
Oregon has no sales tax and therefore provides the largest differential in tax rates.
Idaho has a sales tax rate of 6 percent, so while it provides an incentive for Washington
State residents to cross-border shop, it is much smaller than the incentive to shop in
Oregon. Canada, with its much higher tax rate, offers no incentive for Washington
change.
36This is because the DOR classifies businesses according to their primary taxable activity.
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State consumers to cross-border shop there to avoid sales taxes. The differential in
rates between British Columbia and Washington State actually provides an incentive
for Canadians to shop in Washington, increasing the taxable sales in jurisdictions
near the Canadian border.
To estimate the response of consumers to the regime change observed at the
tax jurisdiction level, I estimate Equation (1.19) using OLS including both tax-
jurisdiction and time fixed effects. To estimate if a differential consumer response
occurs I allow for the impact of the policy to vary across border groups by including
interaction terms. I estimate
lnSalesicqt = β0 + αi + τqt + β1TaxDiffiqt + β2Policyqt
+ β3Policyqt × TaxDiffiqt
+
3∑
j
{β4,jPolicyqt ×Borderj + β5,jBorderj × TaxDiffiqt
+ β6,jBorderj × Policyqt × TaxDiffiqt}+ βX + εicqt.
(1.19)
My dependent variable, lnSalesicqt, is the log of the reported real per capita
taxed dollar amount of sales in tax jurisdiction i in county c, for quarter q in year t.
The variable Borderj represents three unique dummy variables, one for each border
group. The variable Border1 is equal to one if a tax jurisdiction is in a county that
borders Oregon. The variable Border2 is equal to one if a tax jurisdiction is in a
county that borders Canada and Border3 is equal to one if a tax jurisdiction is in a
county that borders Idaho. The omitted group is the interior of the state. The variable
αi represents the tax jurisdiction fixed effect while τqt is a quarter-year fixed effect.
The variable X is a vector of controls. It includes the number of establishments per
1000 people, the number of retail establishments per 1000 people, the unemployment
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rate, the fraction of the population under the age of 19, the fraction of the population
over the age of 64. These are all measured at the county level. It also includes the log
of income per capita observed annually, and the cost of travel, measured quarterly,
at the tax jurisdiction level.
To measure the incentive to cross-border shop, I include the variable TaxDiff ,
which is the difference in the sale-tax rates between a Washington State jurisdiction
and the closest lower-tax neighboring state. To allow for the effect of the sales-tax
rate differential to vary before and after the regime change I interact the variable
TaxDiff with the variable Policyqt, which is a binary variable equal to one in all
periods after the regime change. I also allow this effect to vary across the different
border groups by including the triple interaction terms among Border, TaxDiff, and
Policy.
1.7 Empirical Results
I estimate Equation 1.19 for the reported dollar amount of taxed sales per
capita for four classifications of goods, all taxable goods, taxable non-retail trade, tax-
able retail trade, and taxable e-commerce goods. The results are presented in Table
1.3. The primary interest of this paper is to what degree do consumers substitute
between the two means of avoidance. I use the change in enforcement on avoid-
ance on e-commerce purchases to understand how consumer responsiveness to tax
differentials changes with improved enforcement. Because the regime change focused
on ending sales tax avoidance on e-commerce purchases, it should primarily affect
retail and e-commerce purchases. Therefore, I focus on these two categories. The
results from these regressions are presented in Columns (3) and (4). The coefficient
on the interaction of the regime change and the tax differential, Policy × TaxDiff ,
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shows that consumers in the interior became less responsive to increases in the tax
differential for their taxed retail purchases following the regime change. For taxed
e-commerce purchases, consumers in the interior became more responsive to increases
in the tax differential following the regime change. Together these results suggest that
the regime change increased collection of sales taxes on e-commerce purchases and
limited consumers sales-tax avoidance. Because consumers are less able to avoid sales
taxes, they should become less responsive to increases in the tax differential following
the regime change.
I now look at consumers behavior when cross-border shopping is possible. The
differential response by consumers in the three border groups to changes in the tax
differential following the regime change can be seen in the coefficients on the triple
interactions of Policy×Border× TaxDiff . For taxed retail sales, these coefficients
show that all border groups became more responsive relative to the interior, in abso-
lute value, following the regime change. The coefficients of the differential response
for consumers near the Oregon or Idaho border both have the expected sign and are
large in magnitude but noisily estimated. The price of goods also determines the fea-
sibility of cross-border shopping. For lower-price goods, e-commerce may have been
a feasible means of avoidance while the cost of travel makes cross-border shopping
infeasible. Increases in tax differentials following the regime change may then make
cross-border shopping feasible for both new goods and new consumers farther from
the border.
The interpretation of estimates for jurisdictions near British Columbia is com-
plicated by Canadian shopping in Washington State. While I do not estimate it in
this paper, the tax differential between Washington State and British Columbia is
beneficial for Canadians to shop in Washington State. How beneficial the tax differ-
ential is, depends on the exchange rate, a complication I do not address here because
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my primary focus is on Washington State consumers. Given that consumers near
British Columbia tend to be farther from lower-tax states than consumers in the
other groups it is expected that they are less able to avoid sales taxes by cross-border
shopping.
The overall responsiveness of consumers before and after the regime change is
also of interest, so I present the elasticities concerning the tax differentials in Table
1.4. Column (6) shows the expected result that consumers near lower-tax borders are
the more responsive to the tax differential than their counterparts in the interior of
the state. Consumers near Oregon are the most responsive, with a one percentage
point increase in the rate differential leading to approximately at 29 percent decrease
in the dollar amount of taxable retail sales per capita. Consumers near Idaho are also
responsive to changes in the tax differential but less so than consumers near Oregon.
A one percentage point increase in the tax differential leads to approximately an 18
percent decrease in taxable retail sales per capita, though the estimate is noisy. As
is expected, consumers in the interior of the state are not responsive to increases in
the tax differential following the regime change. For a one percentage point increase
in the tax differential taxable retail sales increase by 0.42 percent, but the effect is
not statistically different from zero.
The change in each group’s tax elasticities in response to regime change is also
of interest. The within border group differences in the tax elasticities for retail goods
(the differences between Columns (5) and (6)) are statistically significant for each
group except those that are near Oregon.37 This is expected because for the other
groups the best option of sales tax avoidance is e-commerce purchases. For consumers
near Oregon, cross-border shopping allows them to avoid sales taxes completely, so
37The null hypothesis that the elasticities in columns (5) and (6) are equal is rejected at the one
percent level for both the consumers in the interior and those near Canada. The same hypothesis is
rejected at the five percent level for consumers near Idaho.
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we expect the regime change to have less of an impact.
Understanding the impact of the regime change on the tax elasticities for tax
e-commerce sales is more complicated. The regime change shifted which jurisdiction
received the revenue from many of these transactions, so comparing the before and
after elasticities also captures a change in the tax base. Looking at the elasticities
across the groups in Column (8) we can see which group of consumers are the most
responsive. Consumers near Oregon are the most responsive as is expected. Even
if the taxed e-commerce purchases represent hard to obtain goods, consumers near
Oregon could have the good delivered to an Oregon address and completely avoid sales
taxes. This option is not available to consumers elsewhere in the state suggesting they
would be less responsive to changes in the tax differential.
In order to understand the effect of the regime change on taxable sales, I esti-
mate Equation (1.19) replacing quarter-year fixed effects with a quadratic time trend
and seasonal dummies. Running the specification with a time trend and seasonal
dummies allows me to estimate the effect of the regime change because the regime
change is perfectly collinear with the quarter 3, 2008 fixed effect. The results from
this alternative specification are presented in Table 1.5. All coefficients are similar in
sign, magnitude and statistical significance to the estimates in Table 1.3. Using the
coefficient estimates from Table 1.5, I evaluate the effect of the regime change at each
border group’s average tax differential. The results are presented in Table 1.6.
The regime change focuses on reducing sales tax avoidance on e-commerce
purchases and increasing taxable sales. Column (3) and (4) presents the change
in the dollar amount of taxed sales per capita as a result of the regime change.
The regime change did have a positive effect on the taxable sales for jurisdictions
near either Idaho or Canada. It did so without having a significant effect on either
taxed non-retail sales or taxed e-commerce sales. If consumers choose to purchases
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good through e-commerce primarily to avoid taxes then removing that option would
encourage them to substitute back to brick-and-mortar stores if they can no longer
avoid sales taxes. This would increase taxed retail sales while not affecting taxed
e-commerce sales. I find no statistically significant effect on either taxed retail trade
sales or e-commerce purchases for consumers near Oregon. This is consistent with the
story of consumers substituting between the two means of avoidance. It also holds
that consumers near Oregon are unique as both means of avoidance allow them to
avoid sales taxes completely.
1.8 Conclusion
I estimate the effects of a tax regime change in Washington State which
changed their sourcing rules from an origin to a destination principle and made them
members of the SSUTA. My results suggest that improving sales tax collection on
e-commerce purchases is less effective when consumers can substitute to cross-border
shopping. I find that consumers in tax jurisdictions near the state’s borders become
more responsive to the difference in sales tax rates across borders when they are
less able to avoid sales taxes on e-commerce purchases. Consumers near Oregon are
the most responsive to the tax differential following the regime change. I find that
a one percentage point increase in the tax differential reduces the dollar amount of
taxed retail sales per capita by approximately 29 percent. I also find similar evidence
that consumers near Idaho are responsive to the tax differential following the regime
change.
Additionally, I find evidence that the regime change increased taxable retail
sales in jurisdictions that are near either Idaho or British Columbia. It increased
taxable retail sales per capita by 18.5 percent and approximately 20 percent. I find no
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evidence that the regime change had an effect on taxable retail sales for jurisdictions
that are near Oregon. Combined the results suggest that consumers take advantage of
opportunities to avoid sales taxes. For consumers near Oregon, cross-border shopping
continue to provide an attractive option for sales tax avoidance following the regime
change. Consumers elsewhere in the state face either a higher cost of travel or lower
tax differentials making cross-border shopping less attractive. Thus, the elimination
of a universally available means of avoidance should have a differential effect. The
results of this paper are consistent with these expectations.
These findings are important to understanding the effects of the Supreme
Court’s ruling in South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.38 The ruling overturned the prece-
dent that required a physical presence of the firm in order for the State to compel tax
collection. As states respond to the Supreme Court’s ruling and adjust their laws,
consumers will lose e-commerce purchases as a means of sales tax avoidance. For
consumers near the border of a lower-tax state, the option to shop across borders
will remain. Revenue collections for both states and local government in jurisdictions
near borders could be lower than expected following Wayfair if consumers substitute
to cross-shopping.
38South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 585 U.S. (2018).
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1.9 Tables
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics by Border Group
Tax Jurisdictions in Counties that
Border Oregon Border Canada Border Idaho Are in the Interior
mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
Quarterly Taxed Sales Per Capita
All Sellers ($) 3607 2192 4414 4169 3196 3866 5421 8342
Non-Retail Trade Sellers ($) 2293 1588 2373 2330 2005 3491 3035 4301
Retail Trade Sellers ($) 1314 961 2041 2106 1190 1220 2387 4481
E-commerce and Mail Order Sellers($) 43 36 88 144 43 38 55 62
Fraction E-commerce 0.044 0.036 0.065 0.074 0.063 0.063 0.046 0.055
Income Per Capita ($) 60523 11014 48873 10034 52483 8023 66235 36286
Combined Sales Tax Rate 0.0789 0.0040 0.0788 0.0036 0.0791 0.0038 0.0841 0.0059
TaxDiff 0.0789 0.0040 0.0355 0.0293 0.0203 0.0047 0.0695 0.0291
Road Distance (Miles) 55 36 184 68 35 16 167 45
Travel Cost (Proxy) 189 129 628 257 119 59 568 181
Retail Establishments (Per 1000 People) 2.61 0.76 3.59 0.93 2.42 0.62 2.69 0.78
Establishments (Per 1000 People) 32.58 6.22 38.32 8.24 32.99 9.45 33.45 7.92
Unemployment Rate 8.75 2.62 8.64 2.77 7.21 2.60 7.43 2.49
Fraction Youth 0.26 0.03 0.26 0.01 0.26 0.02 0.27 0.04
Fraction Elderly 0.16 0.05 0.17 0.03 0.14 0.05 0.14 0.04
N 1715 1327 1833 9003
Notes: All dollar amounts have been converted to 2015 dollars using the West Coast CPI published by the BLS. Income per capita
is a proxy calculated from zip code level tax return data published by the IRS. The number of returns is used instead of number of
people to calculate the income per capita value.
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics by Border: Pre and Post Regime Change
Tax Jurisdictions in Counties that
Border Oregon Border Canada Border Idaho Are in the Interior
mean: Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
Quarterly Taxed Sales Per Capita
All Sellers($) 3786 3523 4457 4393 2930 3320 5943 5175
(2563) (1991) (4522) (3993) (2180) (4434) (8585) (8213)
Non-retail Trade Sellers ($) 2456 2217 2491 2317 1802 2100 3424 2851
(1875) (1428) (2629) (2173) (1291) (4131) (4739) (4065)
Retail Trade Sellers ($) 1330 1307 1966 2076 1127 1220 2520 2324
(1082) (900) (2187) (2067) (1157) (1248) (4408) (4514)
E-commerce and 24 52 36 112 20 53 33 66
Mail Order Sellers ($) (32) (35) (40) (167) (19) (40) (48) (65)
Fraction E-commerce 0.025 0.053 0.042 0.076 0.038 0.075 0.028 0.055
(0.02) (0.039) (0.062) (0.077) (0.043) (0.068) (0.038) (0.059)
Income Per Capita ($) 60257 60647 48091 49244 49796 53736 65958 66366
(11809) (10625) (11557) (9208) (8589) (7423) (36756) (36063)
Combined Sales Tax Rate 0.0780 0.0793 0.0780 0.0791 0.0785 0.0794 0.0825 0.0849
(0.0037) (0.0040) (0.0031) (0.0037) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0045) (0.0064)
TaxDiff 0.0780 0.0793 0.0363 0.0351 0.0221 0.0194 0.0686 0.0700
(0.0037) (0.004) (0.028) (0.0299) (0.0059) (0.0038) (0.0273) (0.0299)
Road Distance (Miles) 55 55 184 184 35 35 167 167
(36) (36) (69) (69) (16) (16) (45) (45)
Travel Cost (Proxy) 182 192 603 640 116 121 549 577
(124) (132) (243) (263.8) (57) (60) (170) (186)
Retail Establishments 2.75 2.54 3.71 3.53 2.53 2.37 2.82 2.64
(Per 1000 People) (0.86) (0.71) (0.86) (0.96) (0.54) (0.65) (0.81) (0.75)
Establishments 31.59 33.04 37.99 38.49 32.53 33.20 33.19 33.58
(Per 1000 People) (6.47) (6.05) (8.22) (8.25) (8.34) (9.93) (8.04) (7.86)
Unemployment Rate 6.88 9.62 7.10 9.37 5.68 7.93 5.69 8.25
(1.23) (2.64) (1.99) (2.79) (1.65) (2.65) (1.70) (2.38)
Fraction Youth 0.27 0.25 0.27 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.28 0.27
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
Fraction Elderly 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.18 0.13 0.15 0.12 0.14
(0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04)
N 546 1169 427 900 583 1250 2892 6111
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. All dollar amounts have been converted to 2015 dollars using the West Coast CPI published
by the BLS. Income per capita is a proxy calculated from zip code level tax return data published by the IRS. The number of returns is
used instead of number of people to calculate the income per capita value.
33
Table 1.3: Log Real Per Capita Taxable Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Goods Non-Retail Trade Retail Trade E-commerce
TaxDiff -4.644 -5.756 4.266 -2.955
(4.46) (4.996) (4.512) (5.945)
Policy 0.465*** 0.574*** 0.436*** 0.608***
(0.111) (0.138) (0.103) (0.0887)
Policy × TaxDiff -3.163*** -3.709** -3.848*** -4.054***
(1.157) (1.485) (0.958) (0.763)
Borders OR × TaxDiff -20.68*** -19.26** -17.14* -3.643
(7.243) (7.904) (10.08) (14.49)
Borders Canada × TaxDiff 0.785 0.423 -3.414 -3.285
(4.33) (4.897) (4.293) (5.481)
Borders ID × TaxDiff 8.595* 8.678* -4.982 8.748
(4.597) (4.974) (5.137) (6.693)
Policy × Borders OR 0.868 0.916 1.115 1.523
(1.113) (1.047) (1.339) (1.278)
Policy × Borders Canada -0.106 -0.151 -0.177* -0.377***
(0.104) (0.126) (0.0882) (0.0729)
Policy × Borders ID 0.256 0.33 0.293 0.0728
(0.242) (0.311) (0.235) (0.152)
Policy × Borders OR × TaxDiff -9.348 -9.872 -12.68 -18.34
(14.25) (13.61) (16.65) (16.09)
Policy × Borders Canada × TaxDiff 3.247** 3.146** 6.525*** 10.13***
(1.293) (1.553) (1.189) (0.988)
Policy × Borders ID × TaxDiff -13.34 -19.08 -15.13 -6.985
(10.61) (13.59) (9.236) (6.013)
Tax Jurisdiction F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter-Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13931 13902 13902 13900
Adjusted R2 0.179 0.172 0.142 0.701
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable is log of
the real per capita dollar amount of taxed sales in a tax jurisdiction in a quarter. It is based on the NAICS classification
of the seller. All dollar amounts are in 2015 dollars. The variable Policy is perfectly collinear with the 2008 Quarter 3
fixed effect so the fixed effect is dropped.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 1.4: Semi-elasticities with respect to the TaxDiff
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All Goods Non-retail Trade Retail Trade E-commerce
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
Interior -4.644 -7.807* -5.756 -9.465** 4.266 0.418 -2.955 -7.009
(4.460) (4.147) (4.996) (4.439) (4.512) (4.148) (5.945) (5.326)
Borders Oregon -25.32*** -37.83*** -25.01*** -38.59** -12.87 -29.40** -6.599 -28.99
(6.156) (13.33) (6.942) (16.20) (9.357) (12.00) (14.40) (25.93)
Borders Canada -3.859* -3.774** -5.333** -5.896*** 0.852 3.529 -6.240** -0.166
(2.021) (1.593) (2.259) (2.107) (2.389) (2.201) (3.066) (3.261)
Borders Idaho 3.951 -12.55 2.921 -19.87 -0.715 -19.70 5.792 -5.247
(2.933) (12.25) (2.923) (14.88) (3.723) (12.30) (4.476) (6.688)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Elasticities are obtained from
Table 1.3.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 1.5: Log Real Per Capita Taxable Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Goods Non-retail Trade Retail Trade E-commerce
TaxDiff -4.710 -6.817 5.727 -10.58
(3.975) (4.603) (3.849) (6.880)
Policy 0.171* 0.182 0.290*** 0.215***
(0.0879) (0.113) (0.0642) (0.0551)
Policy × TaxDiff -3.215*** -3.614** -4.101*** -3.638***
(1.134) (1.464) (0.903) (0.822)
Borders OR × TaxDiff -20.52*** -18.44** -17.74* 3.257
(7.324) (7.655) (10.20) (16.10)
Borders Canada × TaxDiff 0.909 0.531 -3.420 -7.631
(4.485) (5.045) (4.258) (6.998)
Borders ID × TaxDiff 8.088 8.392 -5.960 1.252
(4.822) (5.227) (5.074) (8.404)
Policy × Borders OR 0.842 0.928 1.030 1.503
(1.111) (1.047) (1.320) (1.294)
Policy × Borders Canada -0.102 -0.143 -0.179** -0.399***
(0.104) (0.128) (0.0843) (0.0770)
Policy × Borders ID 0.254 0.333 0.275 0.0804
(0.245) (0.310) (0.232) (0.163)
Policy × Borders OR × TaxDiff -8.973 -9.968 -11.56 -18.35
(14.25) (13.61) (16.43) (16.38)
Policy × Borders Canada × TaxDiff 3.154** 2.973* 6.564*** 10.47***
(1.280) (1.572) (1.079) (1.084)
Policy × Borders ID × TaxDiff -13.30 -19.12 -14.64 -8.174
(10.93) (13.69) (9.395) (6.512)
Tax Jurisdiction F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Seasonal F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13931 13902 13902 13900
Adjusted R2 0.178 0.170 0.140 0.693
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable is log of
the real per capita dollar amount of taxed sales in a tax jurisdiction in a quarter. It is based on the NAICS classification
of the seller. All dollar amounts are in 2015 dollars.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 1.6: Policy Effect at Border Group Sales Tax Rate Averages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Goods Non-retail Trade Retail Trade E-commerce
Interior -0.0521** -0.0687** 0.00514 -0.0375
(0.0235) (0.0319) (0.0219) (0.0257)
Borders Oregon 0.0519 0.0385 0.0843 -0.0163
(0.0669) (0.0682) (0.0789) (0.0729)
Borders Canada 0.0667* 0.0168 0.199*** 0.0589
(0.0353) (0.0417) (0.0322) (0.0432)
Border Idaho 0.0898* 0.0541 0.185** 0.0559
(0.0523) (0.0591) (0.0696) (0.0475)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. The
effect of policy is calculated using each border group’s sample average of TaxDiff. These can
be found in Table 1.1.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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1.10 Figures
Figure 1.1: Map of Border Groups
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Figure 1.2: Heat map of Tax Jurisdictions
(Q4 2016)
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Figure 1.3: Taxed E-commerce and Mail Order
Figure 1.4: Taxed Retail Trade
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Figure 1.5: All Taxed Goods
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Chapter 2
The Impact of State Firearm Laws
on Firearm Deaths (with Benjamin
Schwall)
2.1 Introduction
Gun control is one of the more controversial public policy debates.1 The de-
bate centers on people weighing Second Amendment rights against occurrences of
mass shootings. Moreover, there is an empirical debate about whether gun control is
an effective tool against crime and violence. This empirical debate is best highlighted
by Duggan (2001)’s “More Guns, More Crime” and Lott (2013)’s “More Guns, Less
Crime”.2 We add to the empirical debate by using a new dataset of gun control
provisions that allows us to study how effective various provisions are at reducing
firearm related deaths. We address two questions: do additional gun control provi-
1See Oliphant (2017).
2More authors have participated in this debate and a comprehensive review of the literature is
presented in the next section.
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sions reduce the number of firearm deaths, and are there specific provisions that are
more effective?3
We address these questions by using a state panel from 1991 to 2016 of firearm
death rates, per 100,000 people, collected from the Center for Disease Control. In
addition to the overall firearm death rate, we look at the death rates of homicides
and suicides. We use data from the State Firearm Law Project to identify the total
number of gun control provisions and to construct our specific law variables. Our
identification strategy uses a difference-in-difference approach which takes advantage
of both the variation in the timing of when provisions are passed and the variation in
which provisions states implement. We find that increasing the number of gun control
provisions generally does not have a statistically significant effect on the various death
rates by firearm. Furthermore, none of the specific gun control provisions we included
in our study seem to have a statistically significant effect across the various firearm
death rates.
We first look at the relationship between the total number of gun control
provisions in a state and its firearm death rate. While states with more control
provisions tend to have lower firearm death rates, the relationship does not appear
to be a causal. We find no evidence that the addition of an additional gun control
provision affects the total firearm death rate per 100,000. We also find no effect
on the rate of firearm-related homicides, but we do find a negative and statistically
significant effect of an additional provision on both firearm and non-firearm suicide
rates. However, the magnitudes of both effects are small, about 0.01 deaths per
100,000 people. When we control for state mental health spending per capita, we
find that an increase of one provision reduces the suicide by firearm rate per 100,000
3A separate question, that we do not address, are these gun control measures allowed under the
Second Amendment.
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by .047 deaths per 100,000, but the non-firearm suicide rate per 100,000 increases by
about .047 deaths per 100,000, suggesting a substitution effect.4
Our finding that increased restrictiveness of firearm ownership and use has no
effect on homicides by firearms is consistent with the findings of Lanza (2014). We
differ from Lanza (2014) as he uses Brady Campaign scores as his measure of restric-
tiveness and only looks at the period from 2007 to 2010.5 Our findings are similar
in that the effect of gun restrictiveness on homicides by firearms is not statistically
significant after accounting for state differences. Additionally, we expand the study
by looking at the impact of restrictiveness on suicides and by studying specific gun
control provisions.
Because the effect of provisions may vary, we investigate whether specific pro-
visions have an effect on the various death rates. While the State Firearm Law Project
tracks 133 law provisions, we limit our analysis to 13 provisions. The 13 provisions
are dealer restrictions, a required waiting period for handguns, a permit requirement
to purchase a handgun, laws that prohibit felons from possessing a firearm, laws
that prohibit certain mental health patients from possessing firearms, laws that pro-
hibit people with alcohol and drug abuse issues from possessing firearms, universal
background checks, open carry laws, concealed carry laws, assault weapons ban, re-
striction on magazine capacity, stand your ground laws, and laws that restrict access
to people with misdemeanor domestic violence issues. In choosing these 13 provisions,
we selected those that have been evaluated in previous studies (or similar to those
evaluated) or were some of the broadest and most inclusive provisions included in the
database.
We find that most of our individual provisions do not have a statistically signif-
4We only have data on mental health spending from 2004 to 2013 and therefore this results is
based on a restricted sample.
5The Brady Campaign examines state gun laws and grades states on an 100 point scale.
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icant effect on firearm death rates. While many of these laws are negatively correlated
with firearm deaths, we find no evidence of a causal relationship between the number
of provisions and firearm death rates. The biggest factor driving the decline in firearm
death rates across states appears to be an omitted variable captured in a negative
time trend. Our results are similar when we study only firearm homicide rates. The
provision with the largest effect is one that limits the capacity of magazines. We find
that limiting the capacity of magazines reduces the firearm homicide rate by about
.592 deaths per 100,000 people. This roughly a 15 percent reduction of the mean.6
We also find that laws that allow the open carry of handguns reduce the non-firearm
homicide rate by around .150 deaths per 100,000 people, while not significantly in-
creasing the firearm homicide rate. Across specifications, that reduction as a result
of open carry laws varies between a six to nine percent reduction of the mean number
of non-firearm homicides.7 Provisions that prohibit people with a history of alcohol
or drug abuse from possessing firearms and those that require universal background
checks also reduced the non-firearm homicide rate. Both provisions do so without
having a significant effect on firearm homicide rates. However, provisions that requir-
ing a waiting period before taking possession of a handgun and laws that ban assault
weapons increase the non-firearm homicide rate without having a significant effect on
the firearm homicide rate.
Consistent with our homicide by firearm findings, we find that most gun con-
trol provisions do not affect the suicide by firearm rate. Provisions that prohibit
drug or alcohol users from firearm ownership increase the firearm suicide rates but
decrease the non-firearm suicide rates. Both effects are marginally statistically sig-
nificant. The variable that captures whether a state allows the concealed carry of a
6The average firearm homicide death rate is 3.97.
7The average non-firearm homicide death rate is 2.02.
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handgun has a negative and marginally significant effect on suicide by firearm rates.
It also has a negative and statistically significant effect on non-firearm suicide rates.
The provisions that prevent people convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence from
owning a firearm have a negative and statistically significant effect on non-firearm
suicides.
One explanation of our results is that there are so many guns in circulation
that gun control provisions are unlikely to affect gun violence. In order to test this
hypothesis, we look at whether our specific gun control provisions have an effect on
gun prevalence. We follow a common approach in the literature and use the percent
of total suicides committed by firearms as our measure of gun prevalence (Azrael
et al. 2004; Kleck 2004; Cook and Ludwig 2006; Briggs and Tabarrok 2014). We
find that none of the individual laws we include in our analysis have an effect on gun
prevalence. This is not surprising since the number of firearms in the United States
is estimated to be more than 300 million for most years in our sample.8 Most gun
laws likely affect new ownership and use, and while this could restrict the flow of new
firearms it is unlikely to impact the stock of firearms in a state.
A second explanation for our results is that firearms might flow from less
restrictive states to other states since there is large variation in state gun control
laws. To study the flow of firearms, we use firearm trace data from 2010 to 2016
obtained from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF). The
trace data tells us how many guns were recovered in a state and in which state
the firearm was first purchased. This allows us to study which states have firearms
recovered from other states (imports) and which states have firearms recovered in
other states (exports). We find a negative correlation between the number of gun
control provisions in a state and the number of firearms that originated there but are
8Small Arms Survey (2018).
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recovered in other states. This suggests that states with fewer restrictive provisions
are exporters of firearms used in crimes. This is consistent with the findings of Knight
(2013) and could help explain the ineffectiveness of many state gun laws on reducing
deaths.
2.2 Literature Review
The evidence on the effectiveness of gun control laws is often conflicting. Lott
and Mustard (1997) find that if states with no right-to-carry laws had adopted them,
it would reduce murders, rapes, robberies and aggravated assaults. They estimate
that the annual gain from states adopting right-to-carry laws would have been $5.74
billion in 1992. Duggan (2001) finds that higher gun ownership leads to increased
homicides by firearms and, contrary to Lott and Mustard (1997), that concealed carry
laws increase violent crime rates. Ayres and Donohue III (2003) also find evidence
that conflicts with the findings of Lott and Mustard (1997). Using county-level data,
Ayres and Donohue III (2003) find that shall issue jurisdictions see an increase in the
annual cost of crime by an estimate of half a billion dollars. While we study concealed
carry laws, we focus only on their impact on death rates. We find that they have no
effect on homicides and a small and negative effect on suicides.
Given the political focus on gun control as a means to stop mass shootings,
there isn’t much evidence that gun control laws will have an effect. Blau et al. (2016)
find that of the ten laws included in their analysis most have little correlation with
whether a public shooting occurs.9 However, they do find that state assault weapons
laws are negatively correlated with active shooter events. Laws, like state assault
9Blau et al. (2016) look at nine state laws and the Federal Assault Weapons Ban of 1994. The nine
state laws looked at are assault weapons, purchases permits, gun registration, license requirement,
concealed carry permit, open carry, NFA restrictions, peaceable journey, and stand your ground.
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weapons bans, may have little impact on mass shootings but could be effective in
reducing homicides in general. Since mass shootings account for a small fraction of
gun deaths, we use several of the laws used by Blau et al. (2016) and test their impact
on homicides in general. Some of the most prominent gun control laws discussed in
public debate are assault weapons bans. In our analysis, we find little evidence that
state assault weapon bans impact homicide by firearm death rates.
While most of the political focus on gun control is on mass shootings and
homicides, suicides by firearm account for the majority of firearms deaths each year.
In 2016 suicides by firearm accounted for approximately 60 percent of all firearm
deaths. Gun control that is effective at reducing suicides, but not mass shootings or
homicides, may be argued for on these grounds. For example, Edwards et al. (2018)
find that mandatory waiting periods reduce suicides by firearm by three percent.
They find no evidence that mandatory waiting periods have an effect on non-firearm
suicides or homicides. We find that required waiting periods before taking possession
of handguns also reduce suicides by firearm without increasing non-firearm suicides,
but our results are not statistically significant. The magnitudes of our findings are
also quite small, only a decrease of 0.244 in the suicide by firearm death rate per
100,000. Unlike Edwards et al. (2018) we find that waiting periods to take possession
of a handgun increase homicides.
Most of our results indicate that gun control laws do not have an impact
on deaths, but we do not address their effect on other possible outcomes. There
is some evidence that gun control may have an effect on less observable outcomes.
Anderson and Sabia (2016) find that child access prevention laws have no impact on
the occurrence of school shootings but do decrease the rate at which students are
threatened or injured with a weapon.10 The reduction in the number of students
10A weapon could be either a gun, knife, or club.
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threatened or injured suggests that laws may reduce access to firearms but have no
impact on outcomes such as our variable of interest, deaths. If gun control laws do
reduce access to firearms but have no effect on homicides or suicides it suggests they
are not targeting the correct group of individuals. Policies aimed at reducing firearm
deaths should take this into consideration.
2.3 Data and Summary Statistics
We collected our data from several sources. Our left-hand side variables, death
rates per 100,000, are taken from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) fatal injury reports. These data tend to be more accurate than death rates
from other sources as they are compiled using death certificates.11 The dataset is
available from 1981-2016. The CDC reports allow us to distinguish between the
cause of death, firearm and non-firearm, as well as the intent that caused the death.
We look at all firearms deaths regardless of intent as well as homicides and suicides.
We collected data from several sources as control variables. Those control variables
are the percentage of the state population that is black, the state unemployment rate,
and the per capita personal income of the state.12 We also include general crime rate
data collected from the Uniform Crime Reporting statistics (UCR).
As our measure of restrictiveness of firearm ownership and use, we use the
number of gun control provisions in a state as reported in the database published by
the State Firearm Project.13 This database contains information on specific gun law
11Another often used measure of deaths is the FBI Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics. The FBI
data relies on voluntary reporting by police departments.
12The race data is obtained from the National Center for Health Statistics. The unemployment
rate comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the income data from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis.
13The database can be found at www.statefirearmlaws.org. For a detailed discussion about the
creation of the database see Siegel et al. (2017).
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provisions for each state tracing back to 1991. It breaks down state firearm laws into
133 provisions.14 The provisions focus on either a specific restriction or on the key
language of the statute. In some cases, the database distinguishes between a general
restriction and more nuanced restrictions. In our analysis of individual provisions, we
focus on the provisions that are either the most general or broadest restriction. We
also use the literature to guide our selection.
2.3.1 Total Number of Provisions
Table 2.1 presents our summary statistics for our variables of interests. Law-
Total is the number of provisions that a state has for a particular year. The variation
in LawTotal over the sample greatly depends on the particular state. Figure 2.1 shows
how many provisions each state had in 2016, while Figure 2.2 shows the number of
provisions each state has added since 1991. States such as California, Massachusetts,
and New York all have a high number of provisions initially and then see significant
growth over the time period covered in our analysis. States such as Vermont, North
Dakota, and Wyoming all have a low number of provisions initially and have virtually
no change in laws.
The variation in our outcome of interest across states can be see in the heat
maps presented in Figures 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8. The figures show the
variation across states in both 1991 and 2016. As one would expect, many southern
states have higher firearm death rates. These are states that tend to have few gun
control provisions and are often consider pro-gun culture states. Other states with
high firearm death rates are Alaska, Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming. Comparing
14Each of the 133 provisions is classified into one of 14 categories: ammunition regulations, as-
sault weapons and large-capacity magazines, background checks, buyer regulations, child access
prevention, concealed carry permitting, dealer regulations, domestic violence, gun trafficking, im-
munity, possession regulations, preemption, prohibitions for high-risk gun possessions, and stand
your ground.
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the firearm death rates of these four states across Figures 2.3, 2.4, 2.6 it is clear
that the firearm death rates are being driven suicides by firearms. This highlights
the importance of testing the effectiveness of gun control provision on homicides and
suicides in addition to overall firearm deaths.
We first plot the relationship between the number of provisions and our vari-
ables of interest. Figure 2.9 plots firearm death rate per 100,000 people against the
number of provisions. The main relationship to take away from this graph is that
a high number of provisions tends to associated with a lower death by firearm rate.
Figure 2.10 presents a scatter plot of suicide rates against the number of gun law pro-
visions. The left-hand graph plots suicide rates by firearms and the right-hand side
plots non-firearm suicide rates. There appears to be a negative relationship between
the suicide by firearm rates and the number of gun law provision. However, there
appears to be a positive relationship between non-firearm suicide rates and the num-
ber of gun law provisions. This suggests that there may be a substitution effect. We
repeat the exercise for homicide rates in Figure 2.11. There appears to be a positive
relationship between the firearm homicide rate and the number of gun law provisions.
2.3.2 Specific Laws
One of the questions this paper seeks to answer is what gun control laws are
effective in reducing firearm deaths. While the State Firearm Project tracks 133
provisions, we select 13 provisions to test.15 In selecting these provisions we included
provisions that are similar to ones previously studied in the literature or were some
of the broadest and most inclusive in the database. The 13 provisions we include in
our analysis of individual laws are dealer restrictions, a required waiting period for
handguns, a permit requirement to purchase a handgun, laws that prohibit criminals
15A few of the provisions we test are constructs of several provisions that are similar in nature.
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from possessing a firearm, laws that prohibit certain mental health patients from
possessing firearms, laws that prohibit people with alcohol and drug abuse issues from
possessing firearms, universal background checks, open carry laws, concealed carry
laws, assault weapons bans, restriction on magazine capacity, stand your ground laws,
and laws that restrict access to people with misdemeanor domestic violence issues.
These laws represent 9 of the 14 categories into which the State Firearm Project
classifies gun control provisions.16
Dealer Restriction
For our variable dealer restriction, we generate a single variable which is equal
to one if firearm dealers are required to have a state license, or if dealers or private
seller must keep a record of sales. Figure 2.12 shows the number of states who have
dealer restrictions over our time period. There is not a lot of variation in the number
of states that have dealer restrictions, and it is constant after 2000.
Waiting Period Handgun
This variable is equal to one if there is a mandatory waiting period between
the sale of the gun and when the buyer takes possession of the gun without any
exceptions. The law does not distinguish the amount of time. There is not much
variation is this provision. The variation is from states repealing this provision. The
variation in the number of states with a waiting period can be seen it Figure 2.13.
16The five categories we do not include any provisions from are ammunition regulations, gun
trafficking, child access prevention, preemption, and immunity. We do not include any ammunition
regulations provisions because they are strongly collinear with possession regulations. People who are
prohibited from purchasing or possessing a firearm are also prohibited from purchasing ammunition.
There is too little variation in state gun trafficking laws to identify an effect. Most gun trafficking
laws are set at the federal level. Federal law makes it illegal for an individual to transfer a firearm
to an unlicensed individual outside of their state.
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Permit Handgun
This gun control provision is equal to one if handguns may only be sold to and
possessed by individuals with a valid license or permit to possess or carry handguns.
This provision applies to both licensed dealers and private sellers. The variation in
the number of states with this provision can be seen in Figure 2.14.
Criminal Prohibit
Our variable CriminalProhibit is equal to one if a felony or a violent misde-
meanor conviction prevents an individual from buying or possessing a firearm. Figure
2.15 shows the number of states with a law that prohibit individuals with this restric-
tion from having a firearm and how it changes over the time period covered in our
sample. There is substantial growth in the number of states who have the law in the
mid-1990s, and then the trend is pretty constant after that.
Mental Health Prohibit
To control for states prohibiting firearm purchases or possession by those with
mental health problems we create the variable MentalHealthProhibit. This variable is
equal to one if states prohibit the purchases or possession of a firearm by individuals
who have either involuntarily received mental health treatment, or are considered to
be a danger to themselves or others.17 Figure 2.16 shows the trend line for state
implementation. There is fairly steady growth in the number of states implementing
such restrictions over time.
17Involuntary treatment includes either being committed for inpatient or outpatient treatment.
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Drug and Alcohol Prohibit
We create a variable for the prohibition of individuals with drug or alcohol
issues from buying or possessing a firearm. The variable is equal to one if people
who have been convicted of a drug misdemeanor or have received treatment for either
alcohol-related problems or alcoholism are prohibited from buying or possessing a
firearm.18 Figure 2.17 presents the time trend for state implementation of this re-
striction. Over the time period in our analysis, a handful of states implement this
law and at various times.
Universal Permit
This provision requires a background check at the point of purchases or on
permit applications. It requires background checks on sales by both licensed dealers
and private sellers. It can be thought of at a requirement of universal background
checks for all firearm sales. Figure 2.18 presents the time trend for the state imple-
mentation of universal background checks. The Brady Act was enacted in 1994 and
created the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS). The FBI
launched the system in 1998 after several legal challenges to the Brady Act. Starting
in 1998 we see several states adopt this provisions.
Open Carry
We create the variable OpenCarryAllowed, which is equal to one if a state
allows the open carry of handguns in public places. In general, states permit people
to open carry to some extent, and there is little variation in the variable over time.
The number of states allowing open carry to some extent is displayed in Figure 2.19.
18The restriction based on treatment is based on individuals surpassing a state-defined threshold.
54
Concealed Carry
We also create the variable ConcealedCarryAllowed, which is equal to one if a
state allows individuals to carry a concealed weapon. We are distinguishing between
states that completely ban the concealed carry of a weapon and those that allow
it even with restrictions. Figure 2.20 shows the variation in the number of states
allowing for the concealed carry of a weapon over time. It shows there has been a
fairly steady increase in the number of states allowing concealed carry. We included
concealed carry to help test the argument that individuals carrying firearms can act
as a deterrent for crimes.
Assault Weapons Ban
While there was a federal ban on assault weapons from 1994 to 2004, this is
absorbed by our year fixed effects.19 With this variable, we look at state bans of
assault weapons. There are six states that enact a ban on assault weapons during
our time period. Hawaii only bans assault pistols and therefore is not included. The
timing of the adoption of the state assault weapons bans can be seen in Figure 2.21.
Magazine Capacity
While there was also a federal ban on magazines with a capacity greater than
10 rounds from 1994 to 2004. This is also absorbed by our year fixed effects. Our
variable focuses only on state laws that enacted a ban on the sales of large-capacity
magazines. Figure 2.22 displays the trend of state adoption on the sale of large
capacity magazines.
19The federal ban relied on a two feature test.
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Stand Your Ground
Stand your ground laws permit individuals to use deadly force in response to
an attack as a first option. In other words, an individual has no duty to retreat when
confronted with violence. This variable only counts states that allow such behavior via
statute and without restriction.20 There are 24 states that meet such requirements.
Figure 2.23 displays the time trend for states enacting stand your ground laws.
Domestic Violence Prohibit
This variable is coded as one if a state prevents people convicted of a misde-
meanor crime of domestic violence against a spouse, ex-spouse, or cohabiting partner
from purchasing or possessing a firearm. In 1996, a federal law went into effect that
includes the same restrictions. Many states passed provisions to allow for enforce-
ment by state and local police. This law is also necessary if states wish to impose
stronger laws. For example, some states require a person convicted of misdemeanor
domestic violence to surrender their firearms while other states expand the restriction
to anyone regardless of the relationship to the victim. We do not include the passage
of strong laws in our analysis. Figure 2.24 displays the time trends for states enacting
this restriction.
2.4 Empirical Strategy and Results
While our primary interest is on the effectiveness of individual laws, we first
test for the effectiveness of the total number of laws. The econometric model that we
20We could potentially include another seven states who have adopted such a view through legal
precedent. Three additional states limit such behavior to instances where the individual is within
his or her vehicle. Finally, 11 states that have a “castle doctrine”, where there is no duty for a
person to retreat they are in their home or car, but a person must retreat when in public. In our
analysis we focus only on the law as it is code in the database.
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estimate is
Yit = β0 + β1LawTotalit + βXit + αi + φt + it, (2.1)
where Yit is a death rates per 100,000 for State i in year t.
21 The variable LawTotal is
the total number of legal provisions concerning gun control laws, Xit is a set of state
characteristics including the violent crime rate, per capita income, the unemployment
rate, and the percent of the population that is black. The variable α is state fixed
effects, and φ is year fixed effects.
Table 2.2 presents our results where our dependent variable is the firearm death
rate per 100,000. Looking at the first three columns, we observe a negative relation-
ship between the number of gun control provisions and the rate of death by firearms.
The effect of an additional provision is smaller when state fixed effects are included
and is not statistically significant when state and year fixed effects are included. The
sign on the coefficients of LawTotal becomes positive when we include violent crime
rates in our estimation. This suggests that states with more violent crime are more
likely to have more gun law provisions. Column 5 presents the results for our main
specification and the coefficient on LawTotal is not statistically significant.
Table 2.3 presents the results for homicides by firearm and non-firearm means
(Columns 1 and 2, respectively) and suicides by firearm and non-firearm means
(Columns 3 and 4, respectively) using our fully-specified model. The results show
that increasing the number of gun law provisions does not have a statistically signifi-
cant effect on homicides either by firearms or any other means. Even though it is not
statistically significant, it is interesting to note that the coefficients for LawTotal in
Columns 1 and 2 have opposite signs. The opposite signs again suggest a substitution
effect from firearm to non-firearm means. However, the number of gun law provisions
21As our death rates we use all death by firearm, homicides by firearm and homicides by non-
firearm mean, and suicides by firearm and suicides by non-firearm.
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has a negative and statistically significant effect on the number of suicides by both
firearms and non-firearms. The sign on LawTotal in Column 3 is what we would ex-
pect given Cook and Ludwig (2006)’s argument that suicide by firearm is correlated
with gun prevalence. We expect a substitution by individuals to non-firearm means
to commit suicide when it is harder to obtain firearms, but the sign of the coefficient
on LawTotal in Column 4 is also negative. We attribute this result to the fact that
state mental health spending is likely positively correlated with the number of gun
control provisions.
We collect information on mental health spending per capita from the Henry
J Kaiser Family Foundation for the years 2004-2013.22 We include this information
in our model and present the results in Table 2.4. These results show that more
gun law provisions do have a negative effect on suicides by firearm and a positive
effect on suicides by non-firearm means. While opposite in sign, the magnitude of
the coefficients, -0.0470 and 0.0474, are approximately equal, suggesting almost a
complete substitution from firearm to non-firearm means. Together, the results in
Tables 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 total tell a straightforward story: more gun control provisions
restrict access to firearms, but do not have an effect on state homicide and suicide
death rates.
Ownership vs Use
Gun control provisions can be thought of falling into two broad classifications,
those that restrict ownership and those that restrict use. We classify provisions as
restricting ownership if they prohibit the ownership of all firearms for a set of individ-
22The source of these data is the National Association of State Mental Health Program Directors
Research Institute, Inc. Public data on mental health spending is only available for these years.
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uals or if they make all firearms more difficult to obtain.23 We classify provisions as
restrictive of use if they restrict how a firearm can be used, where they can be used,
or what features a firearm can have. The classification of all provisions are listed in
Table 10 in the Appendix.
We look at the impact of both classifications of provisions on homicides and
suicides. We now estimate Equation (2.1) splitting LawTotal into the total number of
ownership, OwnershipLawTotal, and use provisions, UseLawTotal. Table 2.5 presents
the results. We find that an additional provision that restrict ownership has no impact
on either homicides or suicides death rates by firearm. Suggesting that restricting does
not effect the outcomes in this study. While we find that provisions that restrict the
use of firearms do not reduce homicides or suicides by firearm, they have a small
effect on both homicides and suicides by non-firearm means. Column 2 shows that
additional use provision increases non-firearm homicides by 0.02 deaths per 100,000.
While it is a small effect, it could indicate that firearm serve as a deterrence and
limiting their use reduces deterrence. A deterrence effect would likely be driven by
use such as open carry, concealed carry, or stand-your-ground laws.24 Lastly, Column
4 shows that an additional use provision reduces non-firearm suicides by 0.02 deaths
per 100,000, though the mechanism that is driving this result is not clear.
Individual Laws
Our empirical strategy to identify the effects of individual laws is to use a
difference-in-difference model where we take advantage of the fact that different states
are implementing different laws at different times. This variation combined with state
23For example, having to go through a background check imposes an additional restriction on
individuals purchasing a firearm.
24We test the effect of these provisions later.
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fixed effects will identify the impact of a particular law. We estimate
Yit = β0 + βj
N∑
j=1
Lawjit + βXit + αi + φt + it, (2.2)
where Yit is a variety of death rates per 100,000 by different causes for State i in year
t. The variable Lawj is one of the 13 particular laws we test. The variable Xit is
a vector of state characteristics including the violent crime rate, per capita income,
the unemployment rate, and the percent of the population that is black. The term
α is state fixed effects, and φ is year fixed effects. We also estimate Equation (2.2)
without year fixed effects in order to look at the effect of various federal regulations
(assault weapons ban and gun safety regulation). For these specifications, we include
dummy variables for the federal legislation as well as a quadratic time trend.
Individual Laws and Death by Firearm
Table 2.6 displays our results for the rates of total deaths by firearm. Column
1 presents our results without any fixed effects; thus, they are showing the correlation
between specific laws and death by firearm rates. Most of our coefficients are statisti-
cally significant and have the signs that one would expect. Laws that restrict access
to firearms are negatively correlated with firearm deaths. Our coefficient on Open
Carry is positive, while Concealed Carry and Stand Your Ground have a negative
relationship with the firearm death rate.
Column 2 reports our results with state fixed effects and separate dummy
variables for the federal assault ban and the federal gun safety regulations. In Column
3, we include year fixed instead of a time trend. For the most part, none of the
individual state laws are statistically significant at a 95% confidence interval, and
only a couple of the provisions are marginally significant. The magnitudes of the
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marginally statistically significant laws only represent a maximum reduction of 3-4
percent of the mean. The coefficients for both specifications are similar in magnitude.
Individual Laws and Homicides
Next, we look at whether individual state laws have an impact on homicides.
We test for the effect of individual laws on homicides by both firearm and non-firearm
means to see if there is a substitution effect. Our results are presented in Table 2.7.
Columns 1, 2 and 3 present the results for homicides by firearms. Column 1 presents
our results with state and year fixed effects, while Column 2 adds the percentage of
a state’s population with a hunting license and the fraction of suicides committed
with a firearm and year fixed effects.25 Column 3 presents the results with state fixed
effects and dummy variables for the federal laws. Columns 4, 5, and 6 mirror the first
three columns, except the dependent variable is the homicide rate by non-firearm
means.
The first thing to note is that our estimates on the effect of laws for homicide
rates by firearm are similar in magnitudes across the three specifications. The effect
of limiting the sale of large capacity magazines is negative and statistically significant.
The .592 reduction in the firearm homicide death rate per 100,000 people represents
a reduction of about 15 percent of the mean. The only other provision that has
even a marginally statistically significant effect across all three specifications is a
provision that restricts possession and ownership of a firearm by individuals convicted
of misdemeanor domestic violence. When we include our measure of gun prevalence,
we find that greater prevalence is correlated with more homicides by firearm, but
there is no relationship between gun prevalence and non-firearm homicides.
25We use this as a metric for gun prevalence in the state as suggested by the literature (Azrael
et al. 2004; Kleck 2004).
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When we look at non-firearm homicides rates, more state gun laws have an
effect. For instance, open carry laws have a statistically significant effect on non-
firearm homicides, reducing the non-firearm homicide rate between 6.5 and 9.7 percent
of the mean. This would suggest that allowing individuals to open carry may serve as
a deterrent to some violence. However, we do not see an effect for concealed carry or
stand your ground laws. The coefficient on UniversalPermit, which is equal to one
if background checks are required to be performed on all firearm purchases or permit
applications, is negative and marginally significant. The effect of limiting people with
drug or alcohol abuse problems is negative and statistically significant, representing
a reduction of about 7-8 percent of the mean. The coefficients for waiting periods
to take possession of handguns and bans on assault weapons are both positive and
statistically significant.
Individual Laws and Suicides
We also look at how gun laws affect suicide rates by both firearms and non-
firearms. Table 2.8 present the results. Columns 1 and 2 display the results for the
suicide by firearm rates, with Column 1 looking at the effect of federal laws and
Column 2 including year fixed effects. Column 3 and 4 mirror the first two columns
except that they look at non-firearm suicide rates. In addition to our standard con-
trols, we also control for public health expenditures as a proxy for spending on mental
health. First, the effect of allowing concealed carry has a negative effect on suicide
rates. Across all specifications, the effect of allowing concealed carry reduces the
suicide rate for both firearm and non-firearm by about 6 percent and 8 percent of
the mean, respectively, on average, holding all else constant, although the effect on
firearm suicide rate is only marginally significant. Second, the effect of legislation
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targeting domestic violence stands out as it reduces the suicide rate for non-firearms
by .239 deaths per 100,000 people. This is about a four percent reduction of the
mean. Finally, it is interesting to note that the federal laws are both associated with
a positive effect on the firearm suicide rate, although the gun safety provision is only
marginally so.26 Both magnitudes are relatively small, less than 7 percent of the
mean.
2.5 Mechanism
In general, we find that gun laws do not have a major effect on firearm deaths.
We investigate two possible mechanisms in an attempt to better understand why this
might be the case. First, we look at gun prevalence to see if gun laws are successful
at reducing gun access. Second, we look at the flow of firearms across state borders
by looking at trace data from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearm (ATF).
The ATF tracks firearms that are recovered back to the state of their original retail
purchase.
Gun Prevalence
Because gun laws often attempt to restrict gun access to mitigate gun violence,
we test to see whether the individual gun laws are successful in reducing access. We
then look at the second stage to see whether gun prevalence has an impact on the
firearm death rate and the homicide rate. To test the effect on gun access, we follow
the approach of Cook and Ludwig (2006) and Briggs and Tabarrok (2014) and use the
percentage of suicides committed by firearms as our measure of gun prevalence. After
26The federal laws are the 1994 assault weapons ban and the Protection of Lawful Commerce in
Arms Act and Child Safety Lock Act of 2005.
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estimating the effect of the individual laws on gun prevalence, we use our predicted
measure of gun prevalence to see how that impacts homicide rates.27
Table 2.9 presents our results for these regressions. Column 1 displays the
results for our first stage which looks at how individual laws affect gun prevalence.
None of the coefficients for individual gun laws are statistically significant. This is not
overly surprising since the Small Arms Survey (2018) reports that there are almost as
many firearms as people in the United States for most the time period covered in our
analysis. This may also inform us about why gun control provisions are not successful
at reducing gun violence; there are just so many guns already available that adding
provisions has no effect.
Gun Flow
A second possible explanation for the relative ineffectiveness of gun control
laws could be that states have vastly different restrictions. Thus, individuals may
circumvent strict gun control laws by obtaining their firearms from a less restrictive
state. We look at the ATF trace data from 2010-2017 that tracks the origin of the
firearm after it has been recovered. We are interested in whether states with more
restrictive gun laws recover more guns from other states (imports) and whether states
with less restrictive gun laws have more guns recovered in other states (exports).
We regress, separately, our measures of imports and export (both in levels and
logs) on the total number of gun control provisions. We include our normal controls,
with year fixed effects, while adding population (in 100,000) and the number of guns
recovered from one’s own state. Table 2.10 contains our results.
Columns 1 and 2 report our results for imports and exports, respectively, in
levels whereas Columns 3 and 4 reports our results in logs. We do see a small, positive
27In our first stage we use cluster errors and in the second stage we bootstrap the standard errors.
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relationship between the number of gun control provisions and the number of guns
recovered from another state, although the coefficient is not statistically significant.
However, the sign switches when we take the log of guns imported. One reason why we
may not find a stronger relationship with firearms being imported to highly restrictive
states is that we do not account for the strength of gun control in the neighboring
states.28 In both Columns 2 and 4, we find a negative relationship between the
number of gun control provisions and the number of guns recovered in another state.
Thus, states with fewer restrictions have more firearms recovered in other states. The
results suggest, to some extent, that one explanation for the ineffectiveness of gun
control is the variation in state laws. There is some evidence that guns from less
restrictive gun control states are recovered in other states.
2.6 Policy Implications and Conclusion
If the goal of gun control is to reduce deaths, then we must understand the
effects of the laws being implemented. Thus, we construct a panel dataset to study
the effects of the number of gun control provisions as well as 13 specific gun control
provisions. We use a difference-in-difference approach where we take advantage of the
variation in the timing of provisions being implemented and the variation in the set of
provisions that were enacted in each state. First, we showed that simply adding more
gun control restrictions does not have a significant effect on gun violence. Part of
this result may be driven by the fact that the most effective laws are passed first and
thus, the marginal effect of additional laws should decrease as more laws are passed.
Though this result may be unsurprising, it should be an important part of the gun
policy discussion. Simply adding more laws is unlikely to have any meaningful effect
28Using 2009 trace data Knight (2013) finds that gun flows are more significant between nearby
states.
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on gun violence.
Next, we studied two broad classifications of gun control provisions: restric-
tions on ownership, and restrictions on use. We find that an additional provision
in either classification has an impact on firearm related homicides or suicides. How-
ever, we do find that an additional use provision has a small effect on homicides and
suicides by non-firearm means.
Finally, we studied a set of individual provisions to see which, if any, were
successful and reducing gun fatalities. Based on our results, none of the laws we
studied had a substantial impact on the firearm fatality rate. These results hold
for both homicides and suicides. Additionally, none of the provisions affected gun
prevalence. This last point might illustrate the difficulty of enacting meaningful gun
control provisions. The stock of firearms in the US is so large that reductions in new
gun ownership from additional gun control laws have little effect.
An additional explanation for our results is that people who are willing to
commit a homicide or suicide may not be on the margin when it comes to gaining
access to a firearm. In general, most gun laws focus on three specific areas, reducing
access to firearms, limiting the types of firearms available, and limiting where firearms
can be used. All three areas might impact a person on the margin about owning or
using a firearm but a person with criminal intent is not likely to be a marginal
gun owner. Therefore, laws that focus on reducing homicides by firearm need to be
targeted at changing the cost of carrying or using a firearm for those committing the
crime.
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2.7 Tables
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
LawTotal 1300 23.3 21.5 3 104
Firearm Deaths Crude Rate 1300 11.9 4.57 2.21 28.45
Homicides Non-firearm Deaths Crude Rate∗ 1235 2.02 0.948 0.17 11.71
Homicides Firearm Deaths Crude Rate∗ 1209 3.97 2.46 0.31 17.12
Suicide Non-firearm Deaths Crude Rate 1300 5.79 1.69 2 12.5
Suicide Firearm Deaths Crude Rate 1300 7.58 3.04 1.12 17.68
Violent Crime Rate 1300 434.38 213.1 65.4 1207.2
Per Capita Income 1300 33051 10293 13881 69311
Unemployment Rate 1300 5.64 1.86 2.30 13.7
Percent Black 1300 10.73 9.54 0.280 38.23
Notes: All crude rates are per 100,000 people. Death rates are obtained from the CDC Fatal Injury
Reports.
∗ The CDC does not provide information for states if the category contains less than 10 deaths
during the year.
In Tables 8 and 9 in the Appendix B we estimate the effects of the laws using lower and upper
bounds of the censored data.
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Table 2.2: The effect on the Firearm Death Crude Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. Var: Death Rate Firearm Firearm Firearm Firearm Firearm
LawTotal -0.124*** -0.0872*** -0.0274 0.00357 -0.00856
(0.0216) (0.0223) (0.0243) (0.0183) (0.0180)
ViolentCrimeRate 0.00747*** 0.00711***
(0.00126) (0.00128)
PerCapitaIncome 0.0684
(0.0466)
UnemploymentRate -0.0273
(0.0916)
PercentBlack 0.00520
(0.282)
cons 14.83*** 19.53*** 21.00*** 16.00*** 15.42**
(0.714) (0.279) (0.393) (0.878) (7.315)
State FE N Y Y Y Y
Year FE N N Y Y Y
N 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300
R2 0.337 0.848 0.917 0.933 0.933
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at state level. Dependent
variable is firearm death rate per 100,000 persons.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 2.3: Effects On Homicides and Suicides Crude Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Homicides Suicides
Dep. Var: Death Rate Firearm Non-firearm Firearm Non-firearm
LawTotal -0.00272 0.000729 -0.0180* -0.0141**
(0.0127) (0.00393) (0.00910) (0.00546)
ViolentCrimeRate 0.00511*** 0.00201*** 0.00177*** 0.00195***
(0.00110) (0.000240) (0.000439) (0.000364)
PerCapitaIncome 0.0398 0.0277* 0.0369 0.00303
(0.0344) (0.0150) (0.0283) (0.0212)
UnemploymentRate 0.0591 -0.0410* -0.0703 0.0778**
(0.0591) (0.0236) (0.0498) (0.0354)
PercentBlack 0.153 0.0292 -0.229** -0.216***
(0.189) (0.0412) (0.111) (0.0600)
PublicWelfareDirExp 0.000698* 0.000418*
(0.000402) (0.000231)
cons 0.792 1.522 14.79*** 6.326***
(4.749) (1.055) (2.866) (1.737)
State FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
N 1209 1235 1250 1250
R2 0.909 0.712 0.934 0.864
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Dependent variables are death rate per 100,000 persons.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 2.4: Suicides Crude Rates with Mental Health Expenditures
(1) (2)
Dep. Var: Death Rate Firearm Non-Firearm
LawTotal -0.0470** 0.0474*
(0.0178) (0.0253)
ViolentCrimerate 0.000628 0.00438***
(0.00107) (0.00119)
PerCapitaPersonal 0.0373 -0.0216
(0.0550) (0.0337)
UnemploymentRate -0.0169 0.0953
(0.0684) (0.0607)
BlackPop -0.377** -0.212
(0.162) (0.209)
HealthExpenditure 0.00000821 0.000172
(0.00112) (0.00181)
cons 18.05*** 6.726
(4.489) (5.386)
State FE Y Y
Year FE Y Y
N 496 496
R2 0.954 0.846
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the state level. Dependent variables are death rate per
100,000 persons. Data is for 2004 to 2013. Expenditure is in per
capita terms.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 2.5: Effects On Homicides and Suicides
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Homicides Suicides
Dep. Var: Death Rate Firearm Non-firearm Firearm Non-firearm
OwnershipLawTotal -0.00891 -0.00665 -0.0131 -0.00930
(0.0145) (0.00643) (0.00901) (0.00742)
UseLawTotal 0.0101 0.0207* -0.0285 -0.0243*
(0.0343) (0.0115) (0.0278) (0.0124)
ViolentCrimerate 0.00510*** 0.00203*** 0.00179*** 0.00197***
(0.00109) (0.000234) (0.000436) (0.000364)
PerCapitaPersonal 0.0400 0.0264* 0.0366 0.00283
(0.0345) (0.0146) (0.0287) (0.0214)
UnemploymentRate 0.0596 -0.0407* -0.0697 0.0782**
(0.0591) (0.0232) (0.0500) (0.0355)
BlackPop 0.150 0.0249 -0.229** -0.216***
(0.189) (0.0408) (0.112) (0.0590)
PublicWelfareDirExp 0.000685* 0.000409*
(0.000401) (0.000232)
cons 0.823 1.607 14.75*** 6.288***
(4.730) (1.057) (2.913) (1.710)
N 1209 1235 1250 1250
R2 0.909 0.713 0.934 0.864
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Dependent variables are death rate per 100,000 persons. Controls are included.
* p <0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 2.6: Individual Laws Impact on Firearm Death Rates
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Var: Death Rate Firearm Firearm Firearm
DealerRestrict -2.109*** 0.647* 0.658*
(0.190) (0.379) (0.339)
WaitingHandgun -0.385 1.132* 1.101*
(0.236) (0.618) (0.565)
PermitHandgun -2.332*** -0.178 -0.208
(0.177) (0.515) (0.535)
CriminalProhibit -0.538*** 0.0666 0.0712
(0.193) (0.441) (0.445)
MentalHealthProhibit -0.690*** -0.0813 -0.0404
(0.176) (0.838) (0.837)
DrugAlcoholProhibit -1.304*** 0.0818 0.0801
(0.201) (0.256) (0.259)
universalpermit -0.0510 -0.397 -0.370
(0.308) (0.565) (0.578)
OpenCarryAllowed 3.201*** -0.00672 -0.0722
(0.240) (0.563) (0.600)
ConcealCarry -3.464*** 0.143 0.221
(0.569) (0.505) (0.502)
assault 0.980*** 0.538 0.360
(0.365) (0.745) (0.736)
magazine -1.401*** -0.464 -0.503
(0.303) (0.593) (0.599)
StandYourGround -0.664*** -0.172 -0.104
(0.185) (0.259) (0.268)
DomesticViolence 0.215 0.207 0.198
(0.195) (0.303) (0.312)
Time -0.135*** -0.597***
(0.0455) (0.0684)
Time2 0.0142*** 0.0201***
(0.00142) (0.00145)
FederalAssaultBan 0.686***
(0.224)
FederalGunSafety 0.719***
(0.234)
State FE N Y Y
Year FE N N Y
N 1300 1300 1300
R2 0.728 0.576 0.604
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered
at the state level. Dependent variables are death rate per 100,000
persons. Controls are included.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 2.7: Individual Laws Impact on Homicide Death Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var: Death Rates Firearm Firearm Firearm Non-firearm Non-firearm Non-firearm
DealerRestrict 0.355 0.344 0.329 0.128 0.104 0.150*
(0.243) (0.232) (0.254) (0.0867) (0.0816) (0.0856)
WaitingHandgun 0.761 0.784* 0.717 0.302*** 0.250** 0.276***
(0.457) (0.437) (0.491) (0.110) (0.108) (0.0991)
PermitHandgun -0.176 -0.144 -0.169 0.125 0.125 0.123
(0.363) (0.353) (0.354) (0.0817) (0.0827) (0.0860)
CriminalProhibit -0.112 -0.0948 -0.137 -0.0393 -0.0600 -0.0571
(0.315) (0.308) (0.304) (0.0955) (0.0926) (0.0972)
MentalHealthProhibit 0.211 0.229 0.190 0.0831 0.0823 0.0870
(0.380) (0.368) (0.374) (0.127) (0.127) (0.130)
DrugAlcoholProhibit -0.257 -0.290 -0.256 -0.164** -0.152** -0.170**
(0.207) (0.210) (0.201) (0.0702) (0.0697) (0.0719)
universalpermit -0.0472 -0.0531 -0.0353 -0.209* -0.209* -0.218*
(0.377) (0.344) (0.360) (0.111) (0.108) (0.113)
OpenCarryAllowed 0.112 0.128 0.230 -0.131* -0.150** -0.195**
(0.428) (0.418) (0.421) (0.0775) (0.0680) (0.0869)
ConcealCarry 0.369 0.362 0.277 0.122 0.135 0.122
(0.348) (0.343) (0.363) (0.127) (0.114) (0.132)
assault 0.158 0.169 0.238 0.320*** 0.313** 0.302**
(0.444) (0.449) (0.434) (0.117) (0.118) (0.121)
magazine -0.605** -0.592** -0.588** 0.0486 0.0418 0.0454
(0.268) (0.261) (0.261) (0.109) (0.109) (0.115)
StandYourGround -0.160 -0.171 -0.214 -0.0867 -0.0752 -0.0810
(0.178) (0.178) (0.177) (0.0740) (0.0752) (0.0732)
DomesticViolence 0.374* 0.361* 0.365* -0.0572 -0.0460 -0.0354
(0.203) (0.196) (0.203) (0.0921) (0.0914) (0.0919)
PercentPopHuntLicense 1.467 -2.875
(3.793) (1.933)
fracSuicideGun 2.680*** 0.00515
(0.940) (0.546)
FederalAssaultBan 0.226 -0.245***
(0.147) (0.0836)
FederalGunSafety 0.433** -0.337***
(0.170) (0.124)
Time -0.252*** -0.0467*
(0.0524) (0.0233)
Time×Time 0.00676*** 0.0000787
(0.000964) (0.000491)
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y N Y Y N
N 1209 1209 1209 1235 1235 1235
R2 0.579 0.584 0.548 0.419 0.421 0.383
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Results for regressions with federal
laws and proxies for gun ownership not shown here but the results are similar. Dependent variables are death rate per 100,000
persons. Controls are included.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
73
Table 2.8: Individual Laws Impact on Suicides
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var: Death Rates Firearm Firearm Non-firearm Non-firearm
DealerRestrict 0.214 0.212* 0.0708 0.0771
(0.176) (0.120) (0.0806) (0.0715)
WaitingHandgun -0.181 -0.244 -0.0650 -0.0464
(0.175) (0.154) (0.137) (0.129)
PermitHandgun 0.0316 -0.00441 0.150 0.156
(0.202) (0.211) (0.116) (0.118)
CriminalProhibit 0.193 0.140 0.0809 0.0883
(0.209) (0.202) (0.116) (0.119)
MentalHealthProhibit -0.330 -0.297 -0.0146 -0.0299
(0.434) (0.423) (0.0854) (0.0813)
DrugAlcoholProhibit 0.311* 0.283* -0.309** -0.295*
(0.171) (0.163) (0.145) (0.147)
universalpermit -0.408 -0.366 0.125 0.138
(0.250) (0.255) (0.160) (0.159)
OpenCarryAllowed -0.278 -0.230 -0.00742 -0.00172
(0.195) (0.223) (0.108) (0.103)
ConcealCarry -0.533* -0.548* -0.485*** -0.493***
(0.313) (0.315) (0.156) (0.160)
assault 0.157 0.0992 -0.313 -0.271
(0.415) (0.393) (0.206) (0.211)
magazine -0.0974 -0.109 -0.178 -0.159
(0.413) (0.401) (0.228) (0.230)
StandYourGround 0.169 0.176 -0.115 -0.138
(0.133) (0.138) (0.102) (0.109)
DomesticViolence -0.0996 -0.0966 -0.246** -0.239**
(0.151) (0.156) (0.113) (0.109)
FederalAssaultBan 0.541*** -0.00953
(0.165) (0.0931)
FederalGunSafety 0.318* -0.0304
(0.178) (0.108)
PublicWelfareDirExp 0.000735** 0.000670* 0.000275 0.000278
(0.000343) (0.000347) (0.000210) (0.000227)
Time -0.316*** 0.0615**
(0.0425) (0.0244)
Time×Time 0.0115*** 0.00359***
(0.000830) (0.000646)
State FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE N Y N Y
N 1250 1250 1250 1250
R2 0.359 0.391 0.682 0.692
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. De-
pendent variables are death rate per 100,000 persons. Controls are included.
* p <0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 2.9: Individual Laws Impact on Gun Prevalence
(1) (2) (3)
Stage1 HomicideFirearm HomicideNonFirearm
DealerRestrict 0.00832
(0.00659)
WaitingHandgun 0.0000779
(0.0119)
PermitHandgun -0.0117
(0.00717)
CriminalProhibit -0.00300
(0.00508)
MentalHealthProhibit -0.00659
(0.00659)
DrugAlcoholProhibit 0.0112
(0.00699)
universalpermit 0.000920
(0.0131)
OpenCarryAllowed -0.00225
(0.00723)
ConcealCarry 0.00169
(0.00870)
assault -0.00345
(0.00984)
magazine -0.00452
(0.00794)
StandYourGround 0.000947
(0.00402)
DomesticViolence 0.00305
(0.00418)
gunhat 11.71 -10.20*
(16.37) (5.660)
cons 0.606*** -7.487 7.465**
(0.0458) (10.51) (3.460)
State FE Y N N
Year FE Y Y Y
N 1300 1209 1235
R2 0.627 0.561 0.410
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Stage1 dependent variable is fraction of suicide
by firearm. Stage1 standard errors are clustered at state level. Columns 2 and 3 depen-
dent variables are death rate per 100,000 persons. Columns 2 and 3 standard errors are
bootstrapped, 10000 reps. Controls are included.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 2.10: The Flow of Firearms Across State Borders
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Import Export LogImport LogExport
LawTotal 4.736 -5.555** -0.00278 -0.0118*
(3.754) (2.675) (0.00849) (0.00638)
SameState 0.113** 0.163*** 0.0000380 0.0000535
(0.0521) (0.0403) (0.0000477) (0.0000407)
ViolentCrimeRate 0.134 -0.419 0.000535 0.000292
(0.241) (0.356) (0.000696) (0.000674)
PerCapitaIncome -4.310 -4.043 -0.0105 -0.0157
(7.254) (6.703) (0.0194) (0.0148)
UnemploymentRate 1.329 76.65*** 0.101 0.147*
(34.75) (25.27) (0.0746) (0.0766)
PercentBlack 16.77*** 20.23*** 0.0385*** 0.0308***
(4.783) (6.438) (0.0106) (0.00898)
Population 71.60*** 23.82 0.0882*** 0.0711***
(26.67) (15.66) (0.0296) (0.0243)
cons -36.48 -70.24 4.390*** 4.933***
(391.9) (289.4) (1.106) (0.855)
Year FE Y Y Y Y
N 350 350 350 350
R2 0.722 0.675 0.670 0.669
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at state level.
Data covers the years from 2010 to 2016. Dependent variables are number of firearms
traced. Import is firearms traced to a different state of origin. Export is firearms
recovered in a different state than the state of origin.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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2.8 Figures
Figure 2.1: Total Provisions in 2016
Source: State Firearm Law Project Report
Figure 2.2: Change in Total Provisions from 1991 to 2016
Source: State Firearm Law Project Report
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Figure 2.3: Firearm Death Rates
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Figure 2.4: Homicide Firearm Death Rates
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Figure 2.5: Homicide Non-firearm Death Rates
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Figure 2.6: Suicide Firearm Death Rates
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Figure 2.7: Suicide Non-firearm Death Rates
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Figure 2.8: Fraction of Suicides by Firearm
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Figure 2.9: Firearm Crude Rate v. Law Total
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Figure 2.10: Suicide Rates v. Law Total
Figure 2.11: Homicide Rates v. Law Total
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Figure 2.12: Dealer Restrictions
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Figure 2.13: Waiting for Handguns
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Figure 2.14: Permit for Handguns
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Figure 2.15: Criminal Restrictions
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Figure 2.16: Mental Health Restrictions
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Figure 2.17: Drug and Alcohol Restrictions
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Figure 2.18: Universal Background Checks
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Figure 2.19: Open Carry Permitted
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Figure 2.20: Conceal Carry
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Figure 2.21: Assault Weapons Bans
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Figure 2.22: Limit on Magazine Capacity
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Figure 2.23: Stand Your Ground
97
Figure 2.24: Domestic Violence
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Chapter 3
The Effectiveness of Management
Practices in Primary Schools (with
Patrick Warren)
3.1 Introduction
Organizational performance varies widely within industries, both within and
across countries (Bloom and Van Reenan 2007; Syverson 2011; Bloom et al. 2012).
Variation in management practices is strongly correlated with variation in organiza-
tional performance in manufacturing, health care, and education (Bloom and Van
Reenan 2007; Bloom et al. 2015c; Bloom et al. 2012; Bloom et al. 2015b; Bloom
et al. 2015a; McCormack et al. 2014).
Experimental interventions that improve management practices improve or-
ganizational performance, suggesting that the cross-section correlation is (at least
partially) causal (Bloom et al. 2013; Romero et al. 2018). Bloom et al. (2013) con-
duct a field experiment providing free consulting on management practices, and show
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that large Indian textile firms were able to raise their productivity by 17 percent in the
first year following intervention. This gain was achieved through improved quality,
efficiency, and reduced inventory. Romero et al. (2018) show that similar gains can
be made from intervention in schools. In a field experiment in Liberia, where man-
agement was outsourced to private providers, they find that improved management
increases student test scores in English and math.
Despite evidence that good management practices matter for organizational
performance, we do not quite know how and why management practices matter. Un-
derstanding the causal mechanism for this empirical relationship is important, both
for an improved understanding of the role of managers and for informing educational
policy in particular. One way to study the mechanism is to investigate the circum-
stances under which the relationship between management practices and performance
is strong and when it is weak.
Variation across organizational types, particularly in managerial autonomy,
could be one area where the strength of this relationship varies. Which direction this
relationship goes is theoretically ambiguous. On the one hand, a less constrained
manager has more opportunities to use good management practices, but on the other
hand, the difference between good and bad management could be more important
when a manager has few levers to control. This paper explores whether managerial
flexibility and good management practices are technical substitutes or complements
in the production of organizational performance. We investigate this question in
the field of primary education.1 Our goal is to understand whether management
practices produce differences in student performance based on the school type and
the mechanism that drives this difference.
1Primary education, in the context of this paper, includes any school that includes at least one
grade level from 3-8.
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Education is an excellent area to study the effects of management practices
for several reasons. First, school performance varies widely both across countries
and within countries (OECD 2012). An improved understanding of this mechanism
could lead to improved educational outcomes. Second, the relationship between man-
agement practices and organizational performance appears to be strong in education
(Bloom et al. 2015a; McCormack et al. 2014; Dobbie and Fryer 2013). A strong
relationship between student performance and management practices is necessary to
understand the impact of managerial autonomy. Third, education provides distinct
organizational forms (traditional public, charter, and private) to study. This provides
a clean way to identify differences in the relationship between management practices
and managerial autonomy. Finally, principal autonomy varies by school type. Shakeel
and DeAngelis (2017) find that private school principals in the United States have
greater autonomy in influencing school-level policies than public school principals.
Some evidence already exists, suggesting that there may be some interaction
between the effectiveness of managerial practices and organizational form in the edu-
cational context. Harbolt and Warren (2019), using data from Bloom et al. (2015a),
show that good management practices appear to matter more in private schools than
in public schools. The difference in response to good management practices is driven
by two areas of management: operations and monitoring. Those results are sugges-
tive, but they lack a consistent measure of student performance across schools and
across countries.
We have constructed a new dataset of management practices and student
performance for public, private, and charter schools in Indiana. We used a ‘double-
blind’ telephone interview with 76 school principals in Indiana to collect information
about the management practices in place in their school. To construct our index of
management practices we used the survey instrument and methodology developed by
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Bloom et al. (2015a) in which a principal is asked a series of questions concerning 20
basic management practices falling into one of four categories: operations, monitoring,
target setting, and people. Each practice receives a score from one to five according
to a scoring grid. A one is ‘worst practice’, and a five is ‘best practice’. The overall
measure of a school’s management practices is the average of these scores. The
score for each subcategory is the average of a subset of these scores.(The subsets are
described in Section 3.3.1)
As our measure of school performance we use student test scores on the Indi-
ana state standardized test.2 These test scores allow for a significant improvement
over the measure of student performance used in Bloom et al. (2015a) and Harbolt
and Warren (2019) for several reasons. First, we have the population of student
test scores for students grades 3-8 from 2009-2018. Chetty et al. (2014a) show that
controlling for prior test scores can significantly reduce the bias in estimating value
added in education.3 Past work relies on inferior measures of student performance
such as school-level pass rates on standardized tests or school rankings. If sorting into
schools drives variation in school performance then cross-sectional observations using
aggregated student data could overstate the importance of management practices on a
school’s performance. Controlling for past test scores helps capture the differences in
school performance driven by initial differences in student quality. Therefore, we view
school performance in the context of value added by controlling for each student’s
performance in the prior year.
Second, our measure of student performance is consistent across public and
private schools because both sets of students take the state standardized exam. Pre-
vious work has relied on several different measures of student performance in their
2These student test scores were provided as a result of a data-sharing agreement with the Indiana
Department of Education (IDOE).
3Their study focused on teacher value added.
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comparison across school types, including performance on high school exit exams,
country or school-specific standardized test, school ratings, and GPA. These previous
studies also tended to have performance measures for only a single grade level. Our
measure of performance captures the performance of multiple grade levels in each
school, providing a better measure of school performance. Third, we observe each
student’s scale score instead of school-level pass rates, allowing us to control for a
more detailed level of performance. We are also better able to control for student
characteristics, because we have individual student demographic information instead
of aggregated school-level data.
We find that management practices do matter for student performance. A
one standard deviation (s.d.) increase in a school’s management score is associated
with a 0.024 s.d. increase in a student’s math score and a 0.025 s.d. increase in a
student’s English/Language Arts (ELA) test score. These results are driven by two
management sub-areas, operations and target setting. These results are robust to
controlling for student and school characteristics. However, the relationship between
school management practices and student performance is weaker once we allow for
its importance to vary by school type. Our preliminary results show that good man-
agement practices for private schools are less important for student performance in
mathematics than in ELA. While private school students score higher on the stan-
dardized test that difference is not driven by differences in management practices.
The best predictors of student performance are student characteristics.
3.2 Literature
There has been a significant amount of research trying to explain what drives
differences in school performance. One explanation is differences in management
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practices. Dobbie and Fryer (2013) study the effects of management practices such as
frequent teacher feedback, data-guided instruction, and high expectations on student
performance in 39 charter schools in New York. They find that an index of five
policies can explain approximately 45 percent of the variation in school performance.4
Angrist et al. (2013) study 36 Massachusetts charters schools and find the gains of
urban charter schools can be attributed to the school’s ‘No Excuses’ philosophy.
Both Dobbie and Fryer (2013) and Angrist et al. (2013) find little or no evidence that
traditionally measured school inputs - class size, per pupil expenditure, the fraction
of teachers with no teaching certification - affect student performance.
The importance of management practice in education is not unique to char-
ter schools. Bloom et al. (2015a) survey over 1800 secondary schools across eight
countries and find a strong correlation between a school’s management practices and
student performance. They find that the adoption of management practices in schools
vary both across countries and within countries. They also find large variation in the
adoption of management practices across school types, with autonomous government
schools (similar to US charter schools) having higher management scores than tradi-
tional public and private schools.
The importance of management practices is also not unique to secondary ed-
ucation. In a study of management practices in departments in over 100 universities
in the United Kingdom, McCormack et al. (2014) find that management practices
matter for both research and teaching performance.5 They also find variation in man-
agement practices by type of university, with departments in older research-intensive
universities having higher management scores than those in newer teaching-oriented
4They measure school effectiveness as student gains in math and English/language arts test
scores.
5They use three external rankings as measures of performance. They are the Combined University
Guide ranking, the Research Assessment Exercise ranking, and the National Student Survey ranking.
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universities. These differences in management quality are associated with differences
in department performance.
The variation in the importance of management practices across school type
could be explained by variation in manager autonomy. Using the responses of 9,230
principals in the national representative 2011-12 School and Staffing Survey, Shakeel
and DeAngelis (2017) find significant differences reported by public and private school
principals in their ability to influence school policies. Private school principals have
a higher likelihood of reporting major influence on six of the seven policies studied.6
The relationship between management practices and student performance ap-
pears to be causal, because management intervention has improved student perfor-
mance. Romero et al. (2018) study the Partnership Schools for Liberia program which
delegated management of 93 public primary and pre-primary schools in Liberia to one
of eight private providers, while the schools remained staffed by government teach-
ers. They find that after one year, students in the privately managed schools scored
0.18 s.d. higher in both English and mathematics than students in the government-
managed schools. About half of the improvement in student test scores in privately
managed schools can be attributed to the extra resources provided by the private
organizations. The other half is the result of improved management quality.7
6The seven policies studied are setting performance standards, establishing curriculum, deter-
mining content for professional development, evaluating teachers, hiring teachers, setting discipline
policy, and deciding how the budget will be spent.
7Management quality was proxied by the time a teacher was on task. Teachers in privately
managed schools were 50 percent more likely to be in schools during a spot check and 50 percent
more likely to be engaged in instruction during class time.
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3.3 Data
3.3.1 Measuring Management Practices
To measure management practices we use the survey instrument developed
and used in Bloom et al. (2015a). The survey instrument was adapted for schools
from the survey methodology described in Bloom and Van Reenan (2007). The sur-
vey measures the prevalence of 20 basic management practices in a school, where the
prevalence is measured in reference to a scoring grid ranging from one to five.8 The
main measure of management practices is the average score for a school across all
20 questions. To obtain a score of a school’s management practices, we interviewed
the school’s principal. The instrument also provides an index of management prac-
tices in four broad sub-areas: Operations, Monitoring, Target Setting, and People.
The following description of the twenty management practices come from Bloom et
al. (2015a).
3.3.2 Obtaining School Surveys
As the population of schools for our survey, we used schools listed in the
contact directory on the Indiana Department of Education website.9 The directory
contains 2,275 schools of which 362 schools were listed to be non-public schools. Of
the public schools, 103 charter schools were listed. We limited our contact list to
schools that contained at least one grade between third and eighth, to ensure we
could obtain a measure of student performance. We also excluded all schools with
8The survey instrument and scoring grid can be found in Appendix C.
9See www.doe.in.gov/accountability/find-school-and-corporation-data-reports for
the directory.
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Table 3.1: The Twenty Management Practices
Operations
Standardization of instructional planning processes : school uses meaningful processes
that allow pupils to learn over time.
Personalization of instruction and learning : school incorporates teaching methods
that ensure all pupils can master the learning objectives.
Data-driven planning and pupil transitions : school uses assessment and easily avail-
able data to verify learning outcomes at critical stages.
Adopting educational best practices : school incorporates and shares teaching best
practices and pupil strategies across classrooms accordingly.
Monitoring
Continuous improvement : school implements processes towards continuous improve-
ment and encourages lessons to be captured and documented.
Performance tracking : school performance is regularly tracked with useful metrics.
Performance review : school performance is reviewed with appropriate metrics.
Performance dialogue: school performance is discussed with appropriate content,
depth and communicated to teachers.
Consequence management : mechanisms exist to follow-up on performance issues.
Target Setting
Target balance: school covers a sufficiently broad set of targets at the school, depart-
ment and individual levels.
Target interconnection: school establishes well-aligned targets across all levels.
Time horizon of targets : there is a rational approach to planning and setting targets.
Target stretch: school sets targets with the appropriate level of difficulty.
Clarity and comparability of targets : school sets understandable targets and openly
communicates and compares school, department and individual performance.
People Management
Rewarding high performers : school implements a systematic approach to identifying
good and bad performances, rewarding teacher proportionately.
Fixing poor performers : school deals with underperformers promptly.
Promoting high performers : school promotes employees based on job performance.
Managing talent : school nurtures and develops teaching and leadership talent.
Retaining talent : school attempts to retain employees with high performance.
Creating a distinctive employee value proposition: school has a thought-through ap-
proach to attract employees.
Notes: This table is created from the descriptions in Bloom et al. (2015a). The twenty practices
correspond to the questions in the survey instrument found in Appendix C.
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less than 100 students and all schools with more than 1,500 students. The smaller
schools were excluded to ensure that a sampled school was sufficiently large so that
the type of management practices being studied would matter. Larger schools were
dropped to ensure that outlier schools (in terms of size) would not be driving our
results. Non-comparable schools, such as virtual schools and schools for the blind
and deaf, were excluded.
We took several steps to remove potential sources of bias from the survey
process. First, to avoid any selection bias in contacting schools, the order of the
contact list of schools was randomized in waves of 20 schools, 10 private and 10 public.
Principals were first contacted by email using a standard contact address. The email
included an attachment of the contact letter in pdf and a letter from the Indiana
Association of School Principals (IASP) encouraging principals to participate in an
interview. If no response to the email was received, a phone call was made indicating
an email was sent and a request for a response to the email was made. If the principal
was not reached a message was left.10 If there was still no response, a second phone
call was made following the same procedure as the first. If there was still no response,
followup emails were sent periodically over the projects sampling window.
Second, the study was presented to the principal as a confidential interview
about their management experiences. No mention was made to the principal that
their responses were being scored. Following the procedure laid out in (Bloom et
al. 2015a) the interview started with non-controversial questions such as ‘What is
your school’s vision or plan for the next five years?’ and ‘What tools and resources
are provided to teachers?’.11
10If voicemail was available, a voicemail was left. If the school did not have voicemail, a message
was left with the administrative assistant.
11The questions asked and the scoring rubric are recreated in Appendix C. The original survey
instrument and training materials can be found at https://worldmanagementsurvey.org/.
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Third, principals were never asked about student performance. Instead, we
obtained data on student performance independently from the Indiana Department
of Education (IDOE). While the IDOE generates and publishes school letter grades
as a measure of school performance, the interviewers never mentioned or asked about
a school’s letter grade.12
3.3.3 Interview Quality
To maximize the quality of the interviews, we followed the procedures laid
out in Bloom et al. (2015a). First, we use a ‘double-blind’ interview technique.
The telephone survey was conducted without informing principals that their answers
would be scored. This was to ensure that principals would answer about actual
management practices in places instead of what practices they would like to be in
place.13 Interviewers, on the other hand, did not know anything in advance about
a school’s performance. This was to ensure it did not bias their scoring. The only
information about the school available to the interviewer before the interview was
conducted was the principal’s name and contact information, the school’s name, the
school type, and the county where the school was located.14
Second, in order to avoid leading principals toward a particular answer we used
open-end questions detailed in the survey instrument from Bloom et al. (2015a).15 All
interviews were encouraged to ask open-ended follow-up question listed in the survey
as necessary.
Third, the team of interviewers and scorers (Harbolt and two undergraduate
students at Clemson University) went through common training following the pro-
12Some principals did mention their school’s letter grade over the course of an interview.
13This also holds for principals trying to answer and score well if they knew they were being
evaluated.
14None of the interviewers or scorers were familiar with Indiana geography.
15See Appendix C for the survey instrument.
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cedures laid out in Bloom and Van Reenan (2007) and Bloom et al. (2015a). This
training followed the materials published at https://worldmanagementsurvey.org.
The training included meeting and discussing good management practices, the survey
instrument, and the scoring rubric. It also included the scoring of a mock interview
script and an out-of-sample live interview.
Fourth, we ‘double-scored’ all the interviews. That is, a second member of
the project listened to the interview and scored each interview. At the end of the
interview, the two members discussed the scores, providing an on-going calibration
in the application of the scoring rubric. The scores of each principal’s responses used
in this analysis are the averages of the two scores.
3.3.4 Choosing Indiana
One of the challenges to evaluating schools performance is to get a measure of
student performance that is comparable across all schools. Indiana provides a unique
opportunity because it is the only state that broadly tests private students using the
same state standardized test that public students take. This is because of Indiana’s
Choice Scholarship Program, which started in the 2011-12 school year to provide
vouchers to eligible Indiana students to offset tuition costs at participating schools.16
For a nonpublic school to accept choice students, all students in the school’s, grades
3-8 must take the required state standardized test. Three hundred eighteen non-
public schools participate in the program. For the 2017-18 school year there were
1,005,287 students enrolled in traditional public schools, 48,465 enrolled in public
charter schools, 50,612 enrolled in non-public schools (excluding choice students),
16Indiana has the largest school choice program in the United States. The program is also less
restrictive than most other states on who is eligible for the choice program.
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and 35,458 choice students.17
3.3.5 Student Performance
As our measure of student performance we use student test scores on the Indi-
ana Statewide Testing for Educational Progress-Plus (ISTEP+). The IDOE provided
de-identified student test scores. The ISTEP+ evaluates students in grades 3-8 every
spring on student achievement levels as measured by the Indiana Academic Standards
for mathematics and English/Language Arts(ELA). The test is administered in two
parts: part one consists of open-ended items, and part two consists of multiple-choice
and technology-enhanced items.18 The cutoffs for passing scores for each grade level
are reported in Table 13 in Appendix C.
3.3.6 Summary Statistics
Given the voluntary nature of the survey, one concern is the selection of the
schools that participate in the survey. The summary statistics show that there is
variation in the management practices both across schools and within each school
type. It also does not appear that schools choosing to participate in the survey have
students performing differently from the population of students. Figures 3.6 and 3.7
show similar distributions of students’ ELA scores, Figures 3.8 and 3.9 show similar
distributions of students’ math scores. However, a t-test confirms that the means of
the sample test scores are slightly different. Math test scores are slightly worse in
the sampled schools but ELA test scores are slightly better in the sampled schools.
Given the opposite effects on the test scores, it does not appear there is a selection
17The state also has open enrollment for public schools. For
the full report see www.doe.in.gov/sites/default/files/choice/
2017-2018-choice-scholarship-program-report-august-update.pdf
18For a full description of the test see www.doe.in.gov/assessment/istep-grades-3-8-10.
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Figure 3.1 shows there is greater variation in the management-practices scores
of private and charter schools than in public schools. However, as evident from Fig-
ures 3.2 - 3.5, the variation in management scores appears to be driven by differences
in the monitoring and management of people. This greater variation in management
scores in private schools is consistent with the idea that there is variation in organi-
zational constraints that allows for private school principals to have more impact on
the policies their school adopts.
Figure 3.10 uses a binscatter to shows the relationship between management
practices and student performance. The relationship appears to be negative but
this could be driven by the inclusion of charter schools which tend to have lower
performing students. Charter schools are often opened in areas with failing schools
and students sort to the best charter school in the area. Well-run charter schools that
attract students performing below grade level would explain this phenomenon. It also
highlights the importance of controlling for students past performance. Figures 3.11-
3.14 show that the negative relationship between management practices and student
performance holds for each of the subcategories of management
Now, if charter schools are excluded from the sample a picture more consistent
with previous works arises. Looking at the relationship between management prac-
tices and student performance by school type shows a positive relationship between
management practices and student performance. Figure 3.15 shows that this relation-
ship only exists in private schools. This suggests that management practices matter
differently for student performance depending on the school type. However, the rela-
tionship between management practices and student performance across school type
19A two-sample Kolmogorov–Smirnov test also rejects the null hypothesis that the sample distri-
bution is the same as the population’s distribution, but the D-statistic for both the ELA and math
test score distributions is quite small. It is less than 0.04 for both distributions.
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varies by management sub-area. Figures 3.16-3.19 show the relationship by manage-
ment subgroup. Figures 3.16 and 3.19 show that the relationships between student
performance and the sub-areas of monitoring and target setting appear to be similar
between public and private schools. The difference across school types is driven by
differences in operations and people management.
While the relationship between management practices and student perfor-
mance appears in correlations, differences in the demographic makeup of public and
private students could be driving the results. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 present the summary
statistics of the school and student makeup. Both tables show that public schools
tend to have more special education students and more students who qualify for free
lunch. Public schools also tend to have more students enrolled and have higher stu-
dent to teacher ratios. Thus, it is important to control for such differences to better
understand the relationship between management practices and student performance.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
To test whether the relationship between management and performance varies
by school type, we run regressions of the form
yis = α + βmanagements
+
∑
org=pri,chart
{SchoolTypeorg + βorgmanagements × SchoolTypeorg}+XiΓ + εis
(3.1)
where yis is the z-scored student ISTEP+ test score for student i in school
s.20 The variable managements is the z-scored management index (It is the z-score
20ITSEP+ scores are z-scored within grade level.
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of the average of the 20 individual management questions). The variable SchoolType
indicates the organizational form of the school, either traditional public, private, or
charter, where traditional public schools are the omitted group.21 The variable Xi is
a vector of control variables which includes the student’s gender, the previous years
z-scored state test score, separate indicators for the student’s race, whether they have
a special education designation, if the student is free or reduced-price lunch, and a
student’s English Language Learner (ELL) status.22
3.5 Results
Before testing to see if management practices matter more in private and
charter schools than in public schools, we test to see if management practices are
important to school performance in general. The results for student performance
in math are presented in Table 3.4 and the results for student performance in ELA
are presented in Table 3.5. The results suggest that on average a 1 s.d. increase
in management practices improves student performance in both math and ELA by
approximately 0.025 s.d.. These results hold controlling for a wide range of student
characteristics.
When we allow the effects of management practices to vary by school type,
the results become much weaker. The results of these regressions are presented in
Tables 3.6 and 3.7. The results of these regressions are merely suggestive at this point
because of the small number of schools in the sample. Especially the limited number
of public and charter schools. In Table 3.6 the interaction terms of private schools
and management score show that management practices have less of effect on student
21While a schools classification is asked as part of the survey, we verify it with its IDOE classifi-
cation.
22Races included are Black, Asian, Hispanic, multiracial, Native American, and Native Hawaiian
or Other Pacific Islander
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performance in math in private schools. This holds for three out of the four man-
agement sub-areas though these results are not statistically significant. These results
conflict with the effects of management practices on student performance in ELA.
Table 3.7 shows that management practices matter more for student performance in
ELA in private schools than in public schools. This result holds for management
practices in general and for all four sub-areas of management practices.
3.6 Conclusion
The relationship between managerial autonomy, management practices, and
organization performance is theoretically ambiguous. In this paper we address the
questions, are good management practices a technical substitute or a complement to
manager/organization autonomy? We find weak evidence that they are complements
in the production of student performance. Education provides a clear distinction
of organizational types (traditional public, private, and charter) and evidence shows
that a principal’s authority to affect school policy is greater in private schools than
in public schools.
Using a unique dataset of the management practice in 76 schools in Indiana
we find that management practices do matter for student performance. However, the
effects do not strongly differ by school type. The strength of these results is currently
limited by the small number of schools surveyed.
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3.7 Tables
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics of Students in Sampled Schools
all Traditional Public Private Charter
mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
Management (z-score) 0.04 0.98 -0.00 0.69 -0.03 0.99 0.48 1.74
Operations (z-score) 0.05 0.98 0.02 0.82 0.09 1.01 0.05 1.48
Monitoring (z-score) -0.06 1.06 -0.20 0.82 0.06 1.07 0.12 1.72
Target (z-score) 0.06 0.95 0.09 0.78 -0.09 0.98 0.49 1.33
People (z-score) 0.07 1.00 0.06 0.75 -0.11 0.99 0.88 1.56
Math (z-score) -0.04 0.94 -0.13 0.98 0.15 0.85 -0.33 0.95
ELA (z-score) 0.03 0.95 -0.13 0.98 0.29 0.86 -0.19 0.93
Years as Principal at school 7.53 5.36 8.11 4.81 7.04 5.52 6.55 6.78
Years at School 9.50 6.88 9.85 7.73 9.34 5.84 8.38 5.90
Male Principal 0.51 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.64 0.48 0.19 0.39
ln(# of Students) 6.05 0.54 6.33 0.49 5.71 0.40 5.94 0.40
ln(Student\Teacher) 2.73 0.21 2.81 0.13 2.61 0.24 2.80 0.20
Male Student 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.53 0.50
Special Ed. 0.13 0.34 0.16 0.37 0.08 0.27 0.19 0.39
Fraction Minority 0.35 0.30 0.36 0.33 0.27 0.17 0.60 0.39
Fraction Reduced Lunch 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.06
Fraction Free Lunch 0.38 0.24 0.47 0.21 0.24 0.16 0.52 0.34
Number of Students 15121 7594 5988 1539
Notes: All management scores are standardized to the sample. The raw scores can be found in Appendix
C. Test scores are standardized with in grade level using the population of scores. Years at school is the
length of time a principal has been at a school. This includes if a principal served in some other role
before coming principal.
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Table 3.3: Summary Statistics of Sampled Schools
all Traditional Public Private Charter
mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
Management (z-score) -0.00 1.00 0.10 0.70 -0.14 1.02 0.41 1.61
Operations (z-score) -0.00 1.00 0.10 0.84 -0.05 1.03 -0.10 1.40
Monitoring (z-score) 0.00 1.00 0.03 0.77 -0.04 1.03 0.11 1.58
Target (z-score) -0.00 1.00 0.15 0.85 -0.19 1.02 0.44 1.25
People (z-score) -0.00 1.00 0.01 0.70 -0.16 1.01 0.81 1.45
Years as Principal at school 6.88 5.37 7.00 5.13 6.80 5.34 6.88 6.90
Years at School 8.92 6.90 8.63 8.17 9.07 6.25 9.13 6.17
Male Principal 0.55 0.50 0.52 0.51 0.63 0.49 0.25 0.46
ln(# of Students) 5.74 0.52 6.06 0.47 5.51 0.46 5.79 0.45
ln(Student\Teacher) 2.69 0.25 2.79 0.15 2.60 0.27 2.83 0.25
Fraction Male Student 0.50 0.05 0.51 0.04 0.48 0.05 0.53 0.05
Fraction Special E.d 0.13 0.09 0.17 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.24 0.18
Fraction Minority 0.30 0.27 0.27 0.30 0.27 0.18 0.54 0.42
Fraction Reduced Lunch 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.06
Fraction Free Lunch 0.35 0.23 0.43 0.21 0.26 0.17 0.52 0.35
Number of Schools 76 27 41 8
Notes: All management scores are standardized to the sample. The raw scores can be found in Appendix
C. Years at school is the length of time a principal has been at a school. This includes if a principal
served in some other role before coming principal.
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Table 3.4: Management and Student Performance Math
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Management Operations Monitoring Target People
Management Var. 0.0243 0.0264 0.0202 0.0285* 0.00471
z-scored (0.0148) (0.0176) (0.0134) (0.0170) (0.0145)
Private 0.0437 0.0420 0.0409 0.0447 0.0369
(0.0457) (0.0450) (0.0453) (0.0464) (0.0456)
Charter -0.0363 -0.0284 -0.0298 -0.0364 -0.0335
(0.0620) (0.0676) (0.0645) (0.0608) (0.0643)
Math (t-1) 0.794*** 0.793*** 0.794*** 0.793*** 0.794***
(0.00919) (0.00900) (0.00919) (0.00928) (0.00915)
Years as Principal -0.00550 -0.00675 -0.00616 -0.00500 -0.00557
at School (0.00441) (0.00447) (0.00409) (0.00454) (0.00431)
Years at School 0.00902*** 0.0101*** 0.00896*** 0.00925*** 0.00823***
(0.00327) (0.00356) (0.00294) (0.00339) (0.00307)
Male Principal -0.0330 -0.0303 -0.0317 -0.0328 -0.0357
(0.0348) (0.0348) (0.0347) (0.0350) (0.0343)
ln(# of Students) 0.0384 0.0347 0.0455 0.0345 0.0299
(0.0346) (0.0349) (0.0353) (0.0338) (0.0338)
ln(Student\Teacher) 0.118 0.139* 0.117 0.105 0.102
(0.0778) (0.0765) (0.0794) (0.0781) (0.0806)
Male Student 0.0177 0.0176 0.0176 0.0177 0.0178
(0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0120)
Reduced price meals -0.0404* -0.0407* -0.0402* -0.0416* -0.0438*
(0.0229) (0.0221) (0.0232) (0.0226) (0.0230)
Free meals -0.106*** -0.104*** -0.104*** -0.106*** -0.105***
(0.0151) (0.0155) (0.0153) (0.0148) (0.0154)
Constant -0.536* -0.573* -0.567* -0.484 -0.430
(0.311) (0.326) (0.319) (0.306) (0.308)
Observations 12244 12244 12244 12244 12244
Adjusted R2 0.720 0.720 0.719 0.720 0.719
Notes: The dependent variable is z-scored student performance on the ISTEP+. Student performance
was standardized with in grade using the complete population of test scores. Additional control including
student race and ELL status are included. Standard errors are clustered by school and are reported in
parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 3.5: Management and Student Performance ELA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Management Operations Monitoring Target People
Management Var. 0.0246* 0.0229* 0.0197 0.0266** 0.0110
(z-scored) (0.0137) (0.0133) (0.0122) (0.0134) (0.0128)
Private 0.0731** 0.0703** 0.0699** 0.0733** 0.0680**
(0.0298) (0.0306) (0.0299) (0.0307) (0.0321)
Charter 0.00974 0.0175 0.0163 0.0101 0.00827
(0.0465) (0.0454) (0.0455) (0.0452) (0.0470)
ELA (t-1) 0.734*** 0.734*** 0.734*** 0.733*** 0.734***
(0.00954) (0.00954) (0.00955) (0.00958) (0.00951)
Years as Principal -0.00705*** -0.00817*** -0.00769*** -0.00659*** -0.00681***
at School (0.00234) (0.00263) (0.00246) (0.00230) (0.00230)
Years at Schools 0.00711*** 0.00798*** 0.00703*** 0.00728*** 0.00611***
(0.00134) (0.00160) (0.00134) (0.00130) (0.00152)
Male Principal -0.00639 -0.00424 -0.00518 -0.00633 -0.00967
(0.0205) (0.0209) (0.0210) (0.0206) (0.0211)
ln(# of Students) 0.0440 0.0395 0.0505* 0.0396 0.0360
(0.0268) (0.0277) (0.0278) (0.0249) (0.0252)
ln(Student\Teacher) 0.0490 0.0639 0.0466 0.0347 0.0339
(0.0536) (0.0585) (0.0546) (0.0530) (0.0528)
Male Student -0.0853*** -0.0855*** -0.0854*** -0.0855*** -0.0850***
(0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0103)
Reduced price meals -0.0634*** -0.0640*** -0.0633*** -0.0649*** -0.0662***
(0.0167) (0.0168) (0.0169) (0.0167) (0.0169)
Free meals -0.102*** -0.101*** -0.101*** -0.102*** -0.102***
(0.0170) (0.0176) (0.0171) (0.0169) (0.0177)
Constant -0.279 -0.294 -0.305 -0.221 -0.180
(0.214) (0.224) (0.226) (0.207) (0.210)
Observations 12226 12226 12226 12226 12226
Adjusted R2 0.691 0.691 0.691 0.691 0.691
Notes: The dependent variable is z-scored student performance on the ISTEP+. Student performance
was standardized with in grade using the complete population of test scores. Additional control including
student race and ELL status are included. Standard errors are clustered by school and are reported in
parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 3.6: Management and Student Performance (Math) by School Type
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Management Operations Monitoring Target People
Management Var. 0.0333 0.0318 0.0471 0.0366 -0.0328
(z-score) (0.0367) (0.0334) (0.0299) (0.0310) (0.0269)
Private 0.0449 0.0420 0.0396 0.0487 0.0413
(0.0457) (0.0452) (0.0433) (0.0468) (0.0437)
Charter -0.0394 -0.0277 -0.0308 -0.0468 -0.0616
(0.0613) (0.0669) (0.0656) (0.0602) (0.0629)
Private × -0.0219 -0.00368 -0.0500 -0.0258 0.0420
Management Var. (0.0417) (0.0375) (0.0386) (0.0354) (0.0327)
Charter × 0.00451 -0.0149 -0.0137 0.0244 0.0785**
Management Var. (0.0355) (0.0412) (0.0294) (0.0343) (0.0322)
Math (t-1) 0.794*** 0.793*** 0.794*** 0.794*** 0.793***
(0.00918) (0.00909) (0.00917) (0.00914) (0.00894)
Years as Principal -0.00493 -0.00698 -0.00583 -0.00433 -0.00643*
at School (0.00437) (0.00455) (0.00395) (0.00454) (0.00383)
Years at School 0.00878** 0.0104*** 0.00918*** 0.00896** 0.00944***
(0.00338) (0.00377) (0.00298) (0.00354) (0.00264)
Male Principal -0.0343 -0.0277 -0.0323 -0.0348 -0.0320
(0.0352) (0.0334) (0.0347) (0.0352) (0.0314)
ln(# of Students) 0.0459 0.0343 0.0652 0.0437 0.0428
(0.0388) (0.0376) (0.0415) (0.0359) (0.0350)
ln(Student\Teacher) 0.108 0.141* 0.0807 0.107 0.103
(0.0780) (0.0763) (0.0804) (0.0763) (0.0810)
Male Student 0.0176 0.0176 0.0174 0.0175 0.0171
(0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0120) (0.0121) (0.0121)
Reduced price meals -0.0423* -0.0402* -0.0420* -0.0436* -0.0440*
(0.0232) (0.0220) (0.0231) (0.0229) (0.0232)
Free meals -0.108*** -0.103*** -0.107*** -0.110*** -0.110***
(0.0153) (0.0154) (0.0153) (0.0150) (0.0158)
Constant -0.553* -0.580* -0.587* -0.546* -0.514*
(0.319) (0.330) (0.318) (0.317) (0.300)
Observations 12244 12244 12244 12244 12244
Adjusted R2 0.720 0.720 0.720 0.720 0.720
Notes: The dependent variable is z-scored student performance on the ISTEP+. Student performance
was standardized with in grade using the complete population of test scores. Additional control including
student race and ELL status are included. Standard errors are clustered by school and are reported in
parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 3.7: Management and Student Performance (ELA) by School Type
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Management Operations Monitoring Target People
Management Var. -0.00136 0.00212 -0.00282 0.0140 -0.0185
(z-score) (0.0386) (0.0253) (0.0285) (0.0301) (0.0301)
Private 0.0706** 0.0663** 0.0708** 0.0711** 0.0718**
(0.0288) (0.0289) (0.0297) (0.0305) (0.0311)
Charter 0.0110 0.0132 0.0171 0.00763 0.00902
(0.0460) (0.0429) (0.0430) (0.0482) (0.0496)
Private × 0.0467 0.0446 0.0415 0.0201 0.0513
Management Var. (0.0420) (0.0279) (0.0332) (0.0335) (0.0337)
Charter × 0.0127 0.00413 0.0116 0.0140 0.0254
Management Var. (0.0434) (0.0349) (0.0343) (0.0435) (0.0383)
ELA (t-1) 0.733*** 0.733*** 0.734*** 0.733*** 0.733***
(0.00955) (0.00955) (0.00953) (0.00956) (0.00959)
Years as Principal -0.00788*** -0.00872*** -0.00792*** -0.00664*** -0.00866***
at School (0.00219) (0.00278) (0.00239) (0.00221) (0.00231)
Years at School 0.00728*** 0.00800*** 0.00682*** 0.00715*** 0.00747***
(0.00137) (0.00192) (0.00140) (0.00134) (0.00186)
Male Principal -0.00638 -0.00301 -0.00490 -0.00701 -0.00850
(0.0199) (0.0208) (0.0206) (0.0201) (0.0204)
ln(# of Students) 0.0308 0.0263 0.0338 0.0371 0.0353
(0.0272) (0.0264) (0.0294) (0.0251) (0.0251)
ln(Student\Teacher) 0.0665 0.0846 0.0765 0.0332 0.0526
(0.0551) (0.0594) (0.0621) (0.0535) (0.0544)
Male Student -0.0855*** -0.0857*** -0.0854*** -0.0855*** -0.0856***
(0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0103)
Reduced price meals -0.0607*** -0.0590*** -0.0619*** -0.0644*** -0.0645***
(0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0168)
Free meals -0.0991*** -0.0946*** -0.0989*** -0.102*** -0.102***
(0.0171) (0.0170) (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0178)
Constant -0.244 -0.271 -0.287 -0.198 -0.226
(0.208) (0.212) (0.220) (0.209) (0.208)
Observations 12226 12226 12226 12226 12226
Adjusted R2 0.691 0.691 0.691 0.691 0.691
Notes: The dependent variable is z-scored student performance on the ISTEP+. Student performance
was standardized with in grade using the complete population of test scores. Additional control including
student race and ELL status are included. Standard errors are clustered by school and are reported in
parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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3.8 Figures
Figure 3.1: Distribution of Management Scores
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of Operations Scores
Figure 3.3: Distribution of Monitoring Scores
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Figure 3.4: Distributions of Target Scores
Figure 3.5: Distribution of People Scores
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Figure 3.6: Distribution of Student Performance
Figure 3.7: Sample Distribution of Student Performance
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Figure 3.8: Distribution of Student Performance
Figure 3.9: Sample Distribution of Student Performance
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Figure 3.10: Performance and Management
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Figure 3.11: Performance and Monitoring
128
Figure 3.12: Performance and Operations Management
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Figure 3.13: Performance and Target Setting
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Figure 3.14: Performance and People Management
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Figure 3.15: Performance and Management by School Type
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Figure 3.16: Performance and Monitoring by School Type
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Figure 3.17: Performance and Operations Management by School Type
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Figure 3.18: Performance and Target Setting by School Type
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Figure 3.19: Performance and People Management by School Type
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Appendix A
Figures 20, 21, and 22 present the general trends in the tax dollar amount
of sales per capita in Washington State tax jurisdictions broken down by the border
group averages. The figures show strong seasonality, with a spike in the taxed dollar
amount of sales per capita in the fourth quarter of each year. Therefore, I control for
quarter-year fixed effects in my analysis to address this.
Figure 20: Taxed E-commerce and Mail Order Sales
Figure 21 show that prior to the regime change tax retail sales per capita in
the interior counties were much higher than in all border counties, but following the
regime change they become similar to the taxed retail sales per capita of the tax
jurisdictions in counties that border Canada.
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Figure 21: Taxed Retail Trade Sales
Figure 22: All Taxed Good Sales
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Appendix B
B.1 Robustness
Because the CDC does not publish death rates for states with less than 10
total deaths in a year, we now estimate the impact of the individual laws on homicides
using an upper and lower bound for those censored death rates. The lower bound
is 0 deaths in a year and the upper bound assumes 10 deaths divided by the state
population.23 The results presented in Tables 8 and 9 are not significantly different
from the estimates in Table 2.7.
As additional robustness checks, the estimations reported in Tables 2.2, 2.6,
2.7, and 2.8 were run including state specific time trends. These results are available
on request. The estimations in Tables 2.2, 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8 were also run with the
inclusion of three years worth of lags on the gun control provisions. These results are
also available on request.
23This is converted to a death rate per 100,000.
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Table 8: Individual Laws Impact on Homicides-Lower Bound
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var: Death Rates Firearm Firearm Firearm Non-firearm Non-firearm Non-firearm
DealerRestrict 0.386 0.368 0.359 0.142* 0.115 0.165**
(0.234) (0.224) (0.245) (0.0758) (0.0692) (0.0760)
WaitingHandgun 0.748 0.745* 0.706 0.288** 0.238** 0.271**
(0.449) (0.431) (0.486) (0.121) (0.113) (0.107)
PermitHandguNn -0.191 -0.168 -0.186 0.103 0.108* 0.100
(0.337) (0.329) (0.326) (0.0620) (0.0613) (0.0675)
CriminalProhibit -0.0429 -0.0387 -0.0757 -0.00284 -0.0245 -0.0173
(0.300) (0.295) (0.291) (0.0966) (0.0935) (0.0978)
MentalHealthProhibit 0.237 0.250 0.233 0.128 0.130 0.135
(0.363) (0.354) (0.359) (0.133) (0.131) (0.138)
DrugAlcoholProhibit -0.237 -0.258 -0.253 -0.165** -0.156* -0.172**
(0.195) (0.194) (0.189) (0.0797) (0.0838) (0.0825)
universalpermit -0.0308 -0.0324 -0.0316 -0.0637 -0.0619 -0.0811
(0.321) (0.302) (0.314) (0.131) (0.125) (0.131)
OpenCarryAllowed 0.133 0.136 0.262 -0.108 -0.122** -0.176**
(0.418) (0.407) (0.409) (0.0742) (0.0603) (0.0833)
ConcealCarry 0.299 0.297 0.206 0.153 0.172 0.172
(0.368) (0.365) (0.379) (0.174) (0.159) (0.171)
assault 0.171 0.177 0.251 0.350*** 0.345*** 0.322***
(0.476) (0.478) (0.463) (0.101) (0.0985) (0.111)
magazine -0.540* -0.532** -0.517* 0.0803 0.0783 0.0730
(0.270) (0.264) (0.261) (0.0995) (0.0973) (0.108)
StandYourGround -0.181 -0.182 -0.232 -0.0971 -0.0838 -0.0818
(0.170) (0.168) (0.170) (0.0747) (0.0742) (0.0728)
DomesticViolence 0.342* 0.337* 0.349* -0.0295 -0.0229 -0.0194
(0.195) (0.192) (0.194) (0.0998) (0.101) (0.100)
PercentPopHuntLicense -0.206 -2.787*
(2.828) (1.421)
fracSuicideGun 1.978** 0.483
(0.798) (0.462)
FederalAssaultBan 0.247 -0.216**
(0.152) (0.0832)
FederalGunSafety 0.523*** -0.225*
(0.177) (0.126)
Time -0.257*** -0.0558**
(0.0467) (0.0223)
Time2 0.00738*** 0.000736
(0.000856) (0.000514)
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y N Y Y N
N 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300
R2 0.570 0.573 0.534 0.382 0.384 0.350
Notes: Recreates Table 2.7 using a lower bound estimate of death rates for censored data. Standard errors in paren-
theses. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Results for regressions with federal laws and proxies for gun
ownership not shown here but the results are similar. Dependent variables are death rate per 100,000 persons. Controls
are included.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
141
Table 9: Individual Laws Impact on Homicides-Upper Bound
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var: Death Rates Firearm Firearm Firearm Non-firearm Non-firearm Non-firearm
DealerRestrict 0.360 0.364 0.339 0.128 0.108 0.150*
(0.248) (0.245) (0.254) (0.0901) (0.0862) (0.0888)
WaitingHandgun 0.785* 0.821* 0.741 0.312*** 0.271** 0.286***
(0.456) (0.447) (0.491) (0.111) (0.112) (0.0995)
PermitHandgun -0.161 -0.141 -0.160 0.139* 0.139* 0.135
(0.354) (0.346) (0.343) (0.0799) (0.0805) (0.0852)
CriminalProhibit -0.0781 -0.0565 -0.116 -0.0298 -0.0485 -0.0499
(0.299) (0.294) (0.290) (0.0938) (0.0917) (0.0952)
MentalHealthProhibit 0.197 0.209 0.192 0.0869 0.0863 0.0916
(0.367) (0.360) (0.364) (0.126) (0.125) (0.129)
DrugAlcoholProhibit -0.294 -0.323 -0.308 -0.192** -0.181** -0.196**
(0.208) (0.213) (0.204) (0.0727) (0.0737) (0.0738)
universalpermit -0.0260 -0.0291 -0.0244 -0.183 -0.181 -0.193
(0.330) (0.315) (0.318) (0.127) (0.123) (0.128)
OpenCarryAllowed 0.115 0.130 0.236 -0.139* -0.151** -0.204**
(0.431) (0.427) (0.425) (0.0766) (0.0681) (0.0865)
ConcealCarry 0.356 0.339 0.269 0.173 0.189 0.183
(0.321) (0.321) (0.333) (0.145) (0.133) (0.148)
assault 0.181 0.191 0.263 0.335*** 0.331*** 0.315***
(0.456) (0.460) (0.449) (0.113) (0.113) (0.117)
magazine -0.588** -0.578** -0.563** 0.0444 0.0414 0.0400
(0.266) (0.261) (0.255) (0.106) (0.105) (0.113)
StandYourGround -0.187 -0.199 -0.240 -0.111 -0.0998 -0.105
(0.171) (0.172) (0.170) (0.0719) (0.0727) (0.0711)
DomesticViolence 0.305 0.294 0.314 -0.0626 -0.0562 -0.0462
(0.196) (0.194) (0.195) (0.0940) (0.0942) (0.0935)
PercentPopHuntLicense 2.025 -2.289
(3.160) (2.155)
fracSuicideGun 1.613* 0.0916
(0.818) (0.425)
FederalAssaultBan 0.166 -0.256***
(0.153) (0.0856)
FederalGunSafety 0.360** -0.334**
(0.175) (0.125)
Time -0.221*** -0.0385
(0.0515) (0.0236)
Time2 0.00620*** 0.0000545
(0.000960) (0.000525)
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y N Y Y N
N 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300
R2 0.564 0.567 0.533 0.405 0.406 0.368
Notes: Recreates Table 2.7 using an upper bound estimate of death rates for censored data. Standard errors in
parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Results for regressions with federal laws and proxies for
gun ownership not shown here but the results are similar. Dependent variables are death rate per 100,000 persons.
Controls are included.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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B.2 Classification
Table 10: Classification of Provision
Description of Provision Classification Description of Provision Classification
State dealer license required for sale of all firearms Ownership No gun carrying allowed on college campuses ex-
cept for concealed weapon permittees
Use
State dealer license required for sale of handguns Ownership No gun carrying on college campuses, including
concealed weapons permittees
Use
Licensed dealers are required to keep and retain
records of all firearm sales
Ownership No gun carrying on elementary school property, in-
cluding concealed weapons permittees
Use
Licensed dealers are required to keep and retain
records of handgun sales
Ownership No open carry of handguns is allowed in public
places
Use
All private sellers and licensed dealers are required
to keep and retain records of all firearm sales
Ownership No open carry of long guns is allowed in public
places
Use
All private sellers and licensed dealers are required
to keep and retain records of handgun sales
Ownership No open carry of handguns is allowed in public
places unless the person has a concealed carry or
handgun carry permit
Use
Licensed dealers are required to report all firearm
sales records to the state
Ownership No open carry of long guns is allowed in public
places unless the person has a permit
Use
Licensed dealers are required to report handgun
sales records to the state
Ownership Permit required to carry concealed weapons Use
All private sellers and licensed dealers are required
to report all firearm sales records to the state
Ownership ”May issue” state Use
All private sellers and licensed dealers are required
to report handgun sales records to the state
Ownership Applicants are required to make a heightened show-
ing to obtain a concealed carry permit
Use
Dealers can retain sales records for at least 60 days
after firearm purchase
Ownership Authorities are required to revoke concealed carry
permits under certain circumstances
Use
Ban on non-commercial dealers Ownership Concealed carry permit process requires a back-
ground check
Use
Mandatory reporting of stolen guns by all firearm
dealers
Ownership Background check process for a concealed carry
permit explicitly requires a check of the NICS
database
Use
State requires at least one store security precaution
for firearm dealers
Ownership Concealed carry permit renewal requires a new
background check
Use
Mandatory police inspections of dealers Ownership Ban on sale of assault weapons beyond just assault
pistols
Use
Dealers are liable for damages resulting from illegal
gun sales
Ownership Ban on sale of assault weapons using a one-feature
definition
Use
Ban on junk guns (sometimes called ”Saturday
night specials”)
Ownership Ban on sale of assault weapons which includes a
list of banned weapons
Use
Waiting period is required on all firearm purchases
from dealers
Ownership Grandfathered weapons must be registered Ownership
Waiting period is required on all handgun pur-
chases from dealers
Ownership Transfer of grandfathered weapons is prohibited Ownership
A license or permit is required to purchase all
firearms
Ownership Ban on sale large capacity magazines beyond just
ammunition for pistols
Use
A license or permit is required to purchase hand-
guns
Ownership No magazines with a capacity of more than 10
rounds of ammunition may be sold
Use
Permit process involves law enforcement Ownership Possession of pre-owned large capacity magazines
is prohibited
Use
Buyers must be fingerprinted at point of purchase Ownership Safety lock required for handguns sold through li-
censed dealers
Use
Safety training or testing required prior to issuing
a firearm license or permit
Ownership Safety lock required for handguns sold through all
dealers
Use
Gun owners must register their firearms with the
state
Ownership Safety lock is required for handguns and must be
approved by state standards
Use
Gun owners must register their handguns with the
state
Ownership All firearms in a household must be stored securely
(locked away) at all times
Use
De facto registration of firearms is in place because
of a recordkeeping requirement for all gun sales
Ownership Criminal liability for negligent storage of guns, re-
gardless of whether child gains access
Use
De facto registration of handguns is in place be-
cause of a recordkeeping requirement for all hand-
gun sales
Ownership Criminal liability for negligent storage of guns if
child gains access
Use
Purchase of handguns from licensed dealers and
private sellers restricted to age 21 and older
Ownership Criminal liability for negligent storage of guns if
child uses or carries the gun
Use
Purchase of long guns from licensed dealers and
private sellers restricted to age 18 and older
Ownership Criminal liability for negligent storage applies re-
gardless of whether gun is loaded or unloaded
Use
Purchase of long guns from licensed dealers re-
stricted to age 21 and older
Ownership Criminal liability for negligent storage applies to
access by children less than 18 years old
Use
Purchase of long guns from licensed dealers and
private sellers restricted to age 21 and older
Ownership Criminal liability for negligent storage applies to
access by children less than 16 years old
Use
Mandatory reporting of lost and stolen guns by
firearm owners
Ownership Criminal liability for negligent storage applies to
access by children less than 14 years old
Use
Buyers can purchase no more than one handgun per
month with no or limited exceptions
Ownership No person may purchase a firearm with the in-
tent to re-sell without the buyer going through a
background check or having already gone through
a background check
Ownership
Firearm possession is prohibited for people with a
felony conviction
Ownership No person may purchase a firearm with the intent
to re-sell to a person who is prohibited from buying
or possessing a firearm
Ownership
Firearm possession is prohibited for people who
have committed a violent misdemeanor punishable
by less than one year of imprisonment
Ownership No person may purchase a handgun with the intent
to re-sell to a person who is prohibited from buying
or possessing a firearm
Ownership
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Table 10 Continued
Description of Provision Classification Description of Provision Classification
Handgun possession is prohibited for people who
have committed a violent misdemeanor punishable
by less than one year of imprisonment
Ownership No person may purchase a firearm on behalf of an-
other person
Ownership
Firearm possession is prohibited for people who
have committed a violent misdemeanor punishable
by more than one year of imprisonment
Ownership No person may purchase a handgun on behalf of
another person
Ownership
Firearm possession is prohibited for people who
have been involuntarily committed to an inpatient
facility
Ownership All handguns sold must have either ballistic fin-
gerprinting or microstamping so that they can be
identified if used in a crime
Use
Firearm possession is prohibited for people who
have been involuntarily committed to an outpatient
facility
Ownership State has a law that requires review of personalized
gun technology
Ownership
Firearm possession is prohibited if person is
deemed by court to be a danger to oneself or others
Ownership No stand your ground law Use
Firearm possession is prohibited for people with a
drug misdemeanor conviction
Ownership State law does not preempt local regulation of
firearms in any way
N/A
Firearm possession is prohibited for some people
with alcohol-related problems
Ownership Any state law that preempts local regulation of
firearms is narrow in its scope (i.e., in one area
of regulation)
N/A
Firearm possession is prohibited for some people
with alcoholism
Ownership State law does not completely preempt local regu-
lation of firearms
N/A
Universal background checks required at point of
purchase for all firearms
Ownership No law provides blanket immunity to gun manufac-
turers or prohibits state or local lawsuits against
gun manufacturers
N/A
Universal background check required at point of
purchase for handguns
Ownership People convicted of a misdemeanor crime of do-
mestic violence against a spouse, ex-spouse, or co-
habitating partner are prohibited from possessing
firearms
Ownership
Background checks required for all gun show
firearm sales at point of purchase
Ownership All people convicted of a misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence are prohibited from possessing
firearms
Ownership
Background checks required for gun show handgun
sales at point of purchase
Ownership People convicted of a misdemeanor crime of do-
mestic violence against a spouse, ex-spouse, or co-
habitating partner are required to surrender their
firearms
Ownership
Background checks conducted through permit re-
quirement for all firearm sales (or universal back-
ground checks)
Ownership People convicted of a misdemeanor crime of do-
mestic violence against a spouse, ex-spouse, or co-
habitating partner are required to surrender their
firearms with no exceptions
Ownership
Background checks conducted through permit re-
quirement for all handgun sales (or universal back-
ground checks)
Ownership The surrender provisions apply if the defendant is
a dating partner of the victim
Ownership
State can retain background check records for at
least 60 days
Ownership State law allows law enforcement to remove
firearms from MCDV offenders
Ownership
Background checks for gun sales or permits have
more than a three day period in which they can be
completed
Ownership State law requires law enforcement officers to re-
move firearms from MCDV offenders
Ownership
Required background checks include an explicit re-
quirement for search of state mental health records
Ownership State law requires law enforcement to remove
firearms from the scene of a domestic violence in-
cident
Ownership
State conducts separate background checks, be-
yond the federal NICS check, for all firearms
Ownership All firearms must be removed from the scene of a
domestic violence incident
Ownership
State conducts separate background checks, be-
yond the federal NICS check, for handguns
Ownership State law automatically prohibits domestic
violence-related restraining order (DVRO) sub-
jects from possessing firearms
Ownership
Vendor license required to sell ammunition Use DVROs are automatically prohibiting if the subject
is a dating partner of the petitioner
Ownership
Records of ammunition sales must be retained Use Ex parte (temporary) DVRO subjects are automat-
ically prohibited from possessing firearms
Ownership
Permit required to purchase ammunition Use Ex parte DVROs are prohibiting if the petitioner
is a dating partner of the DVRO subject
Ownership
All of the state’s high-risk gun possession prohibi-
tions also apply to ammunition possession
Use State law requires DVRO subjects to surrender
their firearms
Ownership
Purchase of any type of ammunition restricted to
age 18 and older
Use No additional finding is required before the firearm
surrender provisions apply
Ownership
Purchase of handgun ammunition restricted to age
21 and older
Use The surrender provisions apply if the subject is a
dating partner of the petitioner
Ownership
Background checks required for ammunition pur-
chase
Use State law requires ex parte DVRO subjects to sur-
render their firearms
Ownership
No possession of handguns until age 21 Ownership No additional finding is required before the ex
parte DVRO firearm surrender provisions apply
Ownership
No possession of long guns until age 18 Ownership The ex parte DVRO surrender provisions apply if
the subject is a dating partner of the petitioner
Ownership
No possession of long guns until age 21 Ownership Law enforcement officials are required to re-
move firearms from people subject to a domestic
violence-related restraining order
Ownership
Family members or law enforcement officers can
confiscate firearms from any person who is deemed
by a judge to represent a threat to themselves or
others
Ownership A stalking conviction is prohibitive for firearm pos-
session
Ownership
Law enforcement officers can confiscate firearms
from any person who is deemed by a judge to rep-
resent a threat to themselves or others
Ownership
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Appendix C
Tables 11 and 12 present the raw management scores. Charter schools have
the highest management scores with traditional public schools having the second
highest scores. There is greater variance in the management scores of private and
charters schools. This fits with the theory that principals in those school have greater
autonomy in the practices they can implement.
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Table 11: Raw Management Scores for Students in Sampled Schools
all Traditional Public Private Charter
mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
Management 3.15 0.61 3.12 0.43 3.11 0.62 3.42 1.07
Operations 3.69 0.73 3.67 0.61 3.72 0.75 3.69 1.10
Monitoring 3.47 0.77 3.37 0.60 3.56 0.78 3.61 1.25
Target 2.80 0.91 2.83 0.75 2.66 0.95 3.22 1.28
People 2.80 0.56 2.79 0.42 2.70 0.56 3.26 0.88
Math (z-score) -0.04 0.94 -0.13 0.98 0.15 0.85 -0.33 0.95
ELA (z-score) 0.03 0.95 -0.13 0.98 0.29 0.86 -0.19 0.93
Number of Students 15121 7594 5988 1539
Table 12: Raw Management Scores for Sample Schools
all Traditional Public Private Charter
mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
Management 3.12 0.62 3.18 0.43 3.04 0.63 3.38 1.00
Operations 3.65 0.74 3.73 0.62 3.62 0.77 3.58 1.04
Monitoring 3.52 0.73 3.54 0.56 3.49 0.75 3.60 1.15
Target 2.74 0.97 2.89 0.82 2.56 0.99 3.17 1.21
People 2.76 0.56 2.77 0.40 2.67 0.57 3.22 0.82
Math (z-score) 0.01 0.88 -0.07 1.06 0.09 0.70 -0.15 1.12
ELA (z-score) 0.15 0.86 -0.00 0.89 0.25 0.76 0.13 1.22
Duration 67.45 12.89 68.67 14.13 66.68 10.82 67.25 18.99
Number of Schools 76 27 41 8
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Table 13: ISTEP+ Approved Cut Scores; Scale Score Ranges
English/Language Arts
Grade Pass Pass+
Minimum Maximum
Score Score
3 428 500 200 800
4 456 529 210 850
5 486 546 220 890
6 502 572 230 900
7 516 592 240 910
8 537 617 250 940
Mathematics
Grade Pass Pass+
Minimum Maximum
Score Score
3 425 480 185 690
4 458 508 210 720
5 480 536 240 750
6 510 560 270 760
7 533 578 305 790
8 554 595 325 800
Table is a re-creation from www.doe.in.
gov/sites/default/files/assessment/
istep3-8-10-cut-scores.pdf
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Table 14: List of Management Practices
Operations
Q1. Standardization of instructional
planning process
Measures how well materials and prac-
tices are standardized and aligned in order
to be capable of moving pupils through
learning pathways over time
Q2. Personalization of instruction and
learning
Measures for flexibility in teach methods
and pupil involvement ensuring all indi-
viduals can master the learning objectives
Q3. Data-driven planning and pupil
transitions
Measures if the school uses assessment to
verify learning outcomes at critical stages,
make data easily available and adapt pupil
strategies accordingly
Q4. Adopting educational best practices Measures how well the school incorporates
teaching best practices and the sharing of
these resources into the classroom
Monitoring
Q5. Continuous improvement Measures attitudes towards process docu-
mentation and continuous improvement
Q6. Performance tracking Measures whether school performance is
measured with the right methods and fre-
quency
Q7. Performance review Measures whether performance is re-
viewed with appropriate frequency and
follow-up
Q8. Performance dialogue Measures the quality of review conversa-
tions
Q9. Consequence management Measures whether differing levels of school
performance (not only individual teacher
performance) lead to different conse-
quences
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Table 14: Continued
Target setting
Q10. Target balance Measures whether the system tracks
meaningful targets tied to pupil outcomes
Q11. Target interconnection Measures whether the school and individ-
ual targets are aligned with each other and
the overall system goals
Q12. Time horizon of targets Measures whether the school has a ratio-
nal approach to planning and setting the
targets
Q13. Target stretch Measures whether targets are appropri-
ately difficult to achieve
Q14. Clarity and comparability of tar-
gets
Measures how easily understandable per-
formance measures are and whether per-
formance is openly communicated
People/talent management
Q15. Rewarding high performers Measures whether good teacher perfor-
mance is rewarded proportionately
Q16. Fixing poor performers Measures whether the school is able to
deal with underperformers
Q17. Promoting high performers Measures whether promotions and career
progression are based on performance
Q18. Managing talent Measures how well the school identifies
and targets needed teaching, leadership
and other capacity in the school
Q19. Retaining talent Measures whether the school will go out
of its way to keep its top talent
Q20. Creating a distinctive employee
value proposition
Measures how strong the teacher value
proposition is to work in the individual
school
Notes: Table is replicated from the technical appendix to Bloom et al. (2015a). The detailed
survey instrument can be found at www.worldmanagementsurvey.org
The following is a replication of the survey instrument created by Bloom et
al. (2015a). For the interviews, a digital version of the instrument was used. Following
the methodology, the questions should be asked in the following order during the
interview: 21, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 22, 23, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20.
The original instrument can be found at https://worldmanagementsurvey.org/.
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Table 15: Education Survey Instrument
Interview Details School and Manger’s Information
a)Position:
School ID: b)Specialty: English:2 Math:2 Reading:2 Science:2
School Name: Social Studies:2 None:2 Other:2
c) If “Other”, what is his/her specialty?
School Name: d) Tenure in post (number of years):
Date (DD/MM/YY): e) Tenure in school (number of years):
Time (24 hour clock):
f) How old is your school (number of years)?
g) Country:
Running Interview2 Listening to Interview2
h)Region:
i) Number of other secondary schools within 30 minutes drive:
Management Questions
1)Standardization of Instructional
Practices
a) How structured or standardized are the instructional planning processes across the
school?
Tests how well materials and
practices are standardized and aligned
in order to be capable of moving
students through learning pathways
over time
b) What tools and resources are provided to teachers (e.g. standards-based lesson plans
and textbooks) to ensure consistent level of quality in delivery across classrooms?
c) What are the expectations for the use of these resources and techniques?
d) How does the school leader monitor and ensure consistency in quality across class-
rooms?
Score:
12 22 32 42 52
-992
Score 1: No clear or institu-
tionalized instructional plan-
ning processes or protocols ex-
ist; little verification or fol-
lowup is done to ensure con-
sistency across classrooms
Score 3: School has defined in-
structional planning processes
or protocols to support in-
structional strategies and ma-
terials and incorporate some
flexibility to meet students
needs; monitoring is only ade-
quate
Score 5: School has imple-
mented a clearly defined in-
structional planning process
designed to align instructional
strategies and materials with
learning expectations and in-
corporate flexibility to meet
student needs; these are fol-
lowed up on through compre-
hensive monitoring or over-
sight
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2)Personalization of Instruction
and Learning
a) How much does the school attempt to identify individual student needs? How are
these needs accommodated for within the classroom?
Tests for flexibility in teaching
methods and student involvement
ensuring all individuals can master
the learning objectives
b) How do you as a school leader ensure that teachers are effective in personalising
instruction in each classroom across the school?
c) What about students, how does the school ensure they are engaged in their own
learning? How are parents incorporated in this process?
Score:
12 22 32 42 52
-992
Score 1: Teachers lead learn-
ing with very low involvement
of students; there is little or no
identification of diverse stu-
dent needs
Score 3: Teachers lead stu-
dents through learning with
students having some influ-
ence over their own learning
Score 5: Emphasis is placed
on personalization of instruc-
tion based on student needs;
school encourages student in-
volvement and participation
in classrooms; school provides
information to and connects
students and parents with suf-
ficient resources to support
student learning
3)Data-Driven Planning and Student
Transitions
a) Is data used to inform planning and strategies? If so how is it used – especially in
regards to student transitions through grades/levels?
Tests if the school uses assessment to
verify learning outcomes at critical
stages, make data easily available and
adapt student strategies accordingly
b) What drove the move towards more data-driven planning/ tracking?
Score:
12 22 32 42 52
-992
Score 1: School may be aware
of critical transitions for stu-
dents, but little or no effort
is made to match support ser-
vices to students; data is often
unavailable or difficult to use
Score 3: School may under-
stand the critical transitions
points for students, although
these are not identified in a
consistent manner; some data
is available, although not nec-
essarily in an integrated or
easy to use manner
Score 5: Student transi-
tions are managed in an in-
tegrated and proactive man-
ner, supported by formative
assessments tightly linked to
learning expectations; data is
widely available and easy to
use
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4) Adopting Educational Best
Practices
a) How does the school encourage incorporating new teaching practices into the class-
room?
Tests how well the school incorporates
teaching best practices and the
sharing of these resources into the
classroom
b)How are these learning or new teaching practices shared across teachers? What about
across grades or subjects? How does sharing happen across schools (community, state-
wide etc), if at all?
c) How does the school ensure that teachers are utilising these new practices in the
classroom? How often does this happen?
Score:
12 22 32 42 52
-992
Score 1: Minimal school-wide
understanding or monitoring
of improved practices or learn-
ings
Score 3: Teachers may often
collaborate to share learnings
or ‘best practice’ techniques;
there is insufficient monitor-
ing or implementation of these
‘best practices’ into the class-
room
Score 5: School provides staff
with opportunities to collab-
orate and share best practice
techniques and learnings with
multiple methods to support
their monitored implementa-
tion in the classroom
5) Continuous Improvement a) When problems (e.g. within school/ teaching tactics/ etc.) do occur, how do they
typically get exposed and fixed?
Tests attitudes towards continuous
improvement
b) Can you talk me through the process for a recent problem that you faced?
c) Who within the school gets involved in changing or improving process? How do the
different staff groups get involved in this?
d) Does the staff ever suggest process improvements?
Score:
12 22 32 42 52
-992
Score 1: Exposing and solving
problems (for the school, indi-
vidual students, teachers, and
staff) is unstructured; no pro-
cess improvements are made
when problems occur, or there
is only one staff group in-
volved in determining the so-
lution
Score 3: Exposing and solv-
ing problems (for the school,
individual students, teachers,
and staff) is approached in an
ad-hoc way; resolution of the
problems involves most of the
appropriate staff groups
Score 5: Exposing and solv-
ing problems (for the school,
individual students, teachers,
and staff) in a structured way
is integral to individual’s re-
sponsibilities, and resolution
involves all appropriate indi-
viduals and staff groups; res-
olution of problems is per-
formed as part of regular man-
agement processes
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6) Performance Tracking a) What kind of main indicators do you use to track school performance? What sources
of information are used to inform this tracking?
Tests whether school performance is
measured with the right methods and
frequency
b) How frequently are these measured? Who gets to see this performance data?
c) If I were to walk through your school, how could I tell how it was doing against these
main indicators?
Score:
12 22 32 42 52
-992
Score 1: Measures tracked do
not indicate directly if over-
all objectives are being met;
tracking is an ad-hoc pro-
cess (certain processes are not
tracked at all)
Score 3: Most performance in-
dicators are tracked formally;
tracking is overseen by the
school leadership only
Score 5: Performance is con-
tinuously tracked and commu-
nicated, both formally and in-
formally, to all staff using a
range of visual management
tools
7) Performance Review a) How often do you review (school) performance –formally or informally– with teachers
and staff?
Tests whether performance is
reviewed with appropriate frequency
and follow-up
b) How frequently are these measured? Who gets to see this performance data?
c) Who is involved in these meetings? Who gets to see the results of this review?
d) What sort of follow-up plan would you leave these meetings with? Is there an
individual performance plan?
Score:
12 22 32 42 52
-992
Score 1: Performance is re-
viewed infrequently or in an
un-meaningful way (e.g. only
success or failure is noted)
Score 3: Performance is re-
viewed periodically with suc-
cesses and failures identified;
results are only communi-
cated to senior staff members
(e.g. department heads); no
clear follow up/ action plan is
adopted
Score 5: Performance is con-
tinually reviewed, based on in-
dicators; all aspects are fol-
lowed up to ensure continuous
improvement; results are com-
municated to all staff
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8) Performance Dialogue a) How are these review meetings structured?
Tests the quality of review
conversations
b) Do you generally feel that you do have enough data for a fact-based review?
c) What type of feedback occurs during these meetings?
Score:
12 22 32 42 52
-992
Score 1: The right data or
information for a constructive
discussion is often not present
or conversations overly focus
on data that is not meaning-
ful; clear agenda is not known
and purpose is not stated ex-
plicitly
Score 3: Review conversations
are held with appropriate data
and information present; ob-
jectives of meetings are clear
to all participating and a clear
agenda is present; conversa-
tions do not, as a matter of
course, drive to the root cause
of the problems
Score 5: Regular review/ per-
formance conversations focus
on problem solving and ad-
dressing root causes; purpose,
agenda and follow-up steps
are clear to all; meetings are
an opportunity for construc-
tive feedback and coaching
9) Consequence Management a) Let’s say you’ve agreed to a follow-up plan at one of your meetings, what would
happen if the plan was not enacted?
Tests whether differing levels of
school performance (NOT only
individual teacher performance) lead
to different consequences
b) How long does it typically go between when a problem is identified to when it is
solved? Can you give me a recent example?
c) How do you deal with repeated failures in a specific department or area of process?
Score:
12 22 32 42 52
-992
Score 1: Failure to achieve
agreed objectives does not
carry any consequences
Score 3: Failure to achieve
agreed results is tolerated for
a period before action is taken
Score 5: A failure to achieve
agreed targets drives retrain-
ing in identified areas of weak-
ness, moving individuals to
where their skills are more ap-
propriate
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10) Target Balance a) What types of targets are set for the school to improve student outcomes? Which
staff levels are held accountable to achieve these stated goals?
Tests whether the system tracks
meaningful targets tied to student
outcomes
b) How much are these targets determined by external factors? Can you tell me about
goals that are not externally set for the school (e.g. by the government or regulators)?
Score:
12 22 32 42 52
-992
Score 1: Performance metrics
and targets are very loosely
defined or not defined at all;
if they exist, they are abso-
lute measures of student out-
comes (e.g. only include gov-
ernment/ school district stip-
ulated targets)
Score 3: Performance metrics
and targets are defined for the
school and individuals (lead-
ers, teachers, staff) in terms of
absolute measures of student
outcomes, which may include
both government targets and
schools internal targets
Score 5: Performance metrics
and targets are defined for the
school and individuals (lead-
ers, teachers, staff) that in-
clude both absolute and value-
added measures of student
outcomes and other metrics
linked to key drivers of stu-
dent outcomes
11) Target Inter-Connection a) How are these goals cascaded down to the different staff groups or to individual staff
members?
Tests whether the school and
individual targets are aligned with
each other and the overall system
goals
b) How are your targets linked to the overall school-system performance and its goals?
Score:
12 22 32 42 52
-992
Score 1: Goals do not cas-
cade down the throughout the
school or school system
Score 3: Goals do cascade, but
only to some staff and/ or de-
partmental heads
Score 5: Goals are aligned and
linked at system level and in-
crease in specificity as they
cascade, ultimately defining
individual expectations for all
staff groups
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12) Time Horizon of Targets a) What kind of time scale are you looking at with your targets?
Tests whether the school has a
rational approach to planning and
setting targets
b) Which goals receive the most emphasis?
c) Are the long-term and short-term goals set independently?
d) Could you meet all your short-run goals but miss your long-run goals?
Score:
12 22 32 42 52
-992
Score 1: The principal’s
(schools) main focus is on
short-term targets
Score 3: There are short and
long-term goals for all levels of
the school system; as they are
set independently, they are
not necessarily linked to each
other
Score 5: Long-term goals are
translated into specific short-
term targets so that short-
term targets become a ‘stair-
case’ to reach long-term goals
13) Target Stretch a) How tough are your targets? How pushed are you by the targets?
Tests whether targets are
appropriately difficult to achieve
b) On average, how often would you say that you and your school meet its targets?
How are your targets benchmarked?
c) Do you feel that on targets all departments/ areas receive the same degree of diffi-
culty? Do some departments/ areas get easier targets?
Score:
12 22 32 42 52
-992
Score 1: Goals are either too
easy or impossible to achieve;
at least in part because they
are set with little teachers’ in-
volvement
Score 3: In most areas, school
leaders pushes for aggressive
goals based on external bench-
marks, but with little buy-
in from teachers; there are a
few “sacred cows” that are
not held to the same rigorous
standard
Score 5: Goals are genuinely
demanding for all parts of the
organization and developed in
consultation with senior staff
(e.g. to adjust external bench-
marks appropriately)
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14) Clarity and Comparability of
Targets
a) If I asked one of your staff members directly about individual targets, what would
they tell me?
Tests how easily understandable
performance measures are and
whether performance is openly
communicated
b) Does anyone complain that the targets are too complex? Could every staff member
employed by the school tell me what they are responsible for and how it will be assessed?
c) How do people know about their own performance compared to other people’s per-
formance?
Score:
12 22 32 42 52
-992
Score 1: Performance mea-
sures are complex and not
clearly understood; school
performance data is not made
public unless mandated
Score 3: Performance mea-
sures are well defined and
communicated; school perfor-
mance data is purely quanti-
tative but goes beyond gov-
ernment requirements and is
made public
Score 5: Performance mea-
sures are well defined,
strongly communicated and
reinforced at all reviews;
school performance data
includes both quantitative
and qualitative measures and
are made public
15) Rewarding High Performers a) How does your evaluation system work? What proportion of your employees’ pay is
related to the results of this review?
Tests whether good teacher
performance is rewarded
proportionately
b) Are there any non-financial or financial bonuses/ rewards for the best performers
across all staff groups? How does the bonus system work (for staff and teachers)?
c) How does your reward system compare to that of other schools?
Score:
12 22 32 42 52
-992
Score 1: People are rewarded
in the same way irrespective
of performance level
Score 3: There is an eval-
uation system which awards
good performance; the system
may include individual finan-
cial and non-financial awards,
but these are always or never
awarded
Score 5: There is an eval-
uation system which rewards
individuals based on perfor-
mance; the system includes
both personal financial and
non-financial awards; rewards
are awarded as a consequence
of well-defined and monitored
individual achievements
Manger’s Bonus:
% of the bonus based on individual performance Refused to Answer
% of the bonus based on school performance Yes2 No2
What is your bonus as a percentage of salary?
% of the bonus based on district performance
Bonus on individual, school, and district performance MUST add up to 100
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16) Removing Poor Performers a) If you had a teacher who was struggling or who could not do his/ her job, what would
you do? Can you give me a recent example?
Tests whether the school is able to
deal with underperformers
b) How long is under-performance tolerated? How difficult is it to terminate a teacher?
c) Do you find staff members/ teachers who lead a sort of charmed life? Do some
individuals always just manage to avoid being fired?
Score:
12 22 32 42 52
-992
Score 1: Poor performance
is not addressed or inconsis-
tently addressed; poor per-
formers are rarely removed
from their positions
Score 3: Poor performance
is addressed, but typically
through a limited range of
methods (e.g. coaching); the
process of terminating an em-
ployee often takes more than a
year to complete and is there-
fore infrequent, even under
conditions of repeated poor
performance
Score 5: Repeated poor per-
formance is addressed, begin-
ning with targeted interven-
tions; poor performers are
moved out of the school when
weaknesses cannot be over-
come
17) Promoting High Performers a) Can you tell me about your career progression/ promotion system?
Tests whether promotions and career
progression are based on performance
b) How do you identify and develop your star performers?
c) What types of professional development opportunities are provided? How are these
opportunities personalized to meet individual teacher needs?
d) How do you make decisions about promotion/ progression and additional opportuni-
ties within the school, such as performance, tenure, other? Are better performers likely
to be promoted faster, or are promotions given on the basis of tenure/ seniority?
Score:
12 22 32 42 52
-992
Score 1: Staff members are
promoted primarily upon the
basis of tenure (e.g. years of
service)
Score 3: Staff members
are promoted upon the ba-
sis of performance; school
provides career opportunities
but usually based on non-
performance related factors
Score 5: School actively iden-
tifies, develops and promotes
its top performing staff mem-
bers
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18) Managing Talent a) How do school leaders show that attracting talented individuals and developing their
skills is a top priority?
Tests how well the school identifies
and targets needed teaching,
leadership and other capacity in the
school
b) How do you ensure you have enough teachers of the right type in the school?
c) Where do you seek out and source teachers?
d) What hiring criteria do you use?
Score:
12 22 32 42 52
-992
Score 1: School has very lim-
ited or no control over the
number and types of teachers,
staff and leadership needed to
meet goals
Score 3: School reactively
controls the number and types
of teachers, staff and lead-
ership needed to meet goals;
school may define hiring crite-
ria and processes, but they are
not linked with key drivers of
student outcomes
Score 5: School proactively
controls the number and types
of teachers, staff and lead-
ership needed to meet goals;
school defines hiring criteria
and processes based on under-
standing of what drives stu-
dent achievement
19) Retaining Talent a) If you had a top performing teacher who wanted to leave, what would the school do?
Tests whether the school will go out
of its way to keep its top talent
b) Could you give me an example of a star performer being persuaded to stay after
wanting to leave?
c) Could you give me an example of a star performer who left the school without anyone
trying to keep him?Score:
12 22 32 42 52
-992
Score 1: We do little to try
and keep our top talent
Score 3: We usually work hard
to keep our top talent
Score 5: We do whatever it
takes to retain our talent
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20) Attracting Talent/Creating a
Distinctive Employee Value
Proposition
a) What makes it distinctive to teach at your school, as opposed to other similar schools?
If you were to ask the last three candidates would they agree? Why?
Tests how strong the teacher value
proposition is to work in the
individual school
b) How do you monitor how effectively you communicate your value proposition and
the following recruitment process?
Score:
12 22 32 42 52
-992
Score 1: Other schools offer
stronger reasons for talented
people to join
Score 3: Our value propo-
sition to those joining our
school is comparable to those
offered by other schools
Score 5: We provide a unique
value proposition to encour-
age talented people join our
school above our competitors
Leadership Questions
21) Leadership Vision a) What is the school’s vision for the next five years? Do teachers/ staff know and
understand the vision?
Tests whether school leaders have an
understanding of the broader set of
challenges that the school, system
and key actors face and the right
mindset to address them
b) Who does your school consider to be your key stakeholders? How is this vision
communicated to the overall school community?
c) Who is involved in setting this vision/ strategy? When there is disagreement, how
does the school leader build alignment?
Score:
12 22 32 42 52
-992
Score 1: School either has
no clear vision, or one de-
fined without substantial
stakeholder collaboration
and which focuses primarily
on meeting state/national
mandates; school leader does
not or cannot articulate a
clear focus on building an
environment conducive to
learning
Score 3: School has defined
a vision that focuses on im-
provement in student out-
comes, but largely focused on
meeting state/national man-
dates, and usually defined
with limited stakeholder col-
laboration; school leaders may
focus on the quality of the
overall school environment,
but often in response to spe-
cific issues
Score 5: School leaders define
and broadly communicate a
shared vision and purpose for
the school that focuses on im-
proving student learning and
outcomes (often beyond those
required by law); vision and
purpose is built upon a keen
understanding of student and
community needs, and defined
collaboratively with a wide
range of stakeholders; school
leader proactively builds envi-
ronment conducive to learning
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22) Clearly Defined Accountability
for School Leaders
a) Who is accountable for delivering on school targets?
Tests whether school leaders are
accountable for delivery of student
outcomes
b) How are individual school leaders held responsible for the delivery of targets? Does
this apply to equity and cost targets as well as quality targets?
c) What authority do you have to impact factors that would allow them to meet those
targets (e.g. budgetary authority, hiring & firing)? Is this sufficient?
Score:
12 22 32 42 52
-992
Score 1: School leaders are
only held accountable for min-
imal targets (e.g. those
set by government), without
school-level or individual con-
sequences for good and poor
performance; leaders have lit-
tle or no autonomy to impact
the areas of accountability
Score 3: School leaders are
held accountable for abso-
lute number of student reach-
ing targets set by government
and school internally, with
school-level & individual con-
sequences for good and poor
performance; leaders are pro-
vided some autonomy to im-
pact the areas of accountabil-
ity
Score 5: School leaders are
held accountable for quality,
equity and cost-effectiveness
of student outcomes within
the school, with school-level
and individual consequences
for good and poor perfor-
mance; leaders are provided
sufficient autonomy to impact
the areas of accountability
23) Clearly Defined Leadership
and Teacher Roles
a) How are the roles and responsibilities of the school leader defined? How are they
linked to student outcomes/performance?
Tests how clearly the roles,
responsibilities and required attributes
of teachers, students and staff are
defined within the school
b) How are leadership responsibilities distributed across individuals and teams within
the school?
c) How are the roles and responsibilities of the teachers defined? How clearly are required
teaching competences defined and communicated?
d) How are these linked to student outcomes/ performance?
Score:
12 22 32 42 52
-992
Score 1: School does not de-
fine clear roles, responsibili-
ties and desired competencies
of school leaders and teachers
Score 3: School defines clear
roles, responsibilities and de-
sired competencies of school
leaders and teachers, but
not necessarily linked with
the drivers of student perfor-
mance and outcomes; concen-
trated leadership amongst se-
nior staff
Score 5: School defines clear
roles, responsibilities and de-
sired competencies of teach-
ers and staff across the school,
built upon an understanding
of what drives student per-
formance and outcomes; lead-
ership responsibilities are dis-
tributed across the school
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Organization Questions
a) How many students are in the school? b) How many teachers are in the school?
c) How many people (including support staff) work in the school?
Please say “Can you walk me through the school’s hierarchy?”. Then iteratively ask “Who does a teacher report to?”,
“Who would [his/her boss] report to”...., Keep asking until you reach the School Head.
d) Number of levels in the school BETWEEN the teacher and the School Head:
e) How many people directly report to the head of the school? (i.e. the # of people directly in the hierarchical layer below him/her)
f) To hire a FULL-TIME TEACHER what agreement would your school head need?
Score:
12 22 32 42 52
-992
Score 1: The school has no author-
ity
Score 3: Requires sign-off from
above the school head based on the
individual case. Typically agreed
(i.e. about 80 or 90% of the time)
Score 5: Complete authority of the
school head
g) To add a new class - for example, introducing a new language such as Mandarin - what agreement would the school head need?
Score:
12 22 32 42 52
-992
Score 1: The school has no author-
ity
Score 3: Requires sign-off from
above the school head based on the
individual case. Typically agreed
(i.e. about 80 or 90% of the time)
Score 5: Complete authority of the
school head
h) To expand the school size - for example admitting 5% more students - what agreement would the school head need?
Score:
12 22 32 42 52
-992
Score 1: The school has no author-
ity
Score 3: Requires sign-off from
above the school head based on the
individual case. Typically agreed
(i.e. about 80 or 90% of the time)
Score 5: Complete authority of the
school head
i) Do you use admissions criteria to select students? j) Can you take me through the criteria you use to select students?
Yes2 No2 -992 Academics2 Geographical2 Siblings2
Other2 If other, what?
k) Who determines these criteria?
Score:
12 22 32 42 52
-992
Score 1: School or school board has
NO authority to set the admission
criteria (mandated by external au-
thorities)
Score 3: School or school board has
shared authority with external au-
thorities to set the admissions cri-
teria
Score 5: School or school board has
complete authority to set the ad-
missions criteria
l) What is the largest CAPITAL INVESTMENT the school leader can make without PRIOR authorization
from outside? (ignore form filling) [PLEASE CROSS CHECK ANY ZERO RESPONSE BY ASKING “what
about buying a new computer - would that be possible?”, and then probe further.
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Ownership
a) What type of school is it? d) Does the school have a religious affiliation – if so with what
religion?
b) Is the school state owned or non-state owned?
State owned2 Non-state owned2 Other2 -992 Not religious2 Anglican2 Catholic2 Hindu2
If other, who? Jesuit2 Jewish2 Mormon2 Muslim2
c) Is the school for-profit or not-for-profit? Protestant2 Other2
For Profit2 Not for Profit2 -992
If other, who? If other, who?
Human Resources
a) Percent of teachers who are union members
If the question above is equal to 100, then the question
below is also equal to 100. Anywhere in between, ensure
answer is provided
g) Ignoring yourself, how well managed do you think the
rest of the school is on scale: 1 to 10, where 1 is worst
practice, 10 is best practice and 5 is average
b) Percent of teachers whose pay is set by union negotiations Overall
c) Average classroom teaching hours per week by teachers Operations
(teaching practices, student transitions)
d) Average actual hours worked per week by teachers (including time
at home)
Talent
(people, promotions, incentives, etc.)
e) Percent of teachers who have left in the past 12 months
f) Roughly how many times bigger is the school leader’s salary than
a starting teacher’s salary. That is, does the school head earn twice
as much, ten times as much, or 100 times as much?
Would you like me to send you a copy of this report when
it is written?
Refused to answer: Yes2 No2 Yes2 No2
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Post Interview
a) Interview duration (minutes)
b) Interviewee knowledge of management practices
Score:
12 22 32 42 52
-992
Score 1: Some knowledge his
school, and no knowledge of
its daily operations
Score 3: Expert knowledge of
his school, and some knowl-
edge of its daily operations
Score 5: Expert knowledge
about his school and its daily
operations
c) Interviewee willingness to reveal information
Score:
12 22 32 42 52
-992
Score 1: Very reluctant to
provide more than basic infor-
mation
Score 3: Provides all basic in-
formation and some more con-
fidential information
Score 5: Totally willing
to provide any information
about the school
d) Interviewee patience
Score:
12 22 32 42 52
-992
Score 1: Little patience -
wants to run the interview
as quickly as possible. I felt
heavy time pressure
Score 3: Some patience -
willing to provide richness to
answers but also time con-
strained. I felt moderate time
pressure
Score 5: Lot of patience - will-
ing to talk for as long as re-
quired. I felt no time pressure.
e) Attitude on the government (if mentioned)
Score:
12 22 32 42 52
-992
Score 1: Government seen en-
tirely as a hindrance - bad for
the school
Score 3: Government helps
the school in some ways but
also a constraint in other ways
- mixed for the school
Score 5: Government helps
the school - good for the
school
f) Number of times mentioned overriding economic factors (e.g. recession)? i) Age of interviewee (don’t ask) - guess if not told
g) Number of times rescheduled (0=never rescheduled) j) Gender of interviewee Male2 Female2
h) Seniority of interviewee
2 1 - Superintendent/Governor/Director/Father
2 2 - Principal/Head Teacher/Head Master
k) Did the interviewee have a degree - guess if not
told
2 3 - Asst. Principal/Vice Principal/Deputy Head/Curriculum Coordinator l) Interview language
2 4 - Department Head/ Subject Coordinator 2 5 - Teacher
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